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9There are things known and there are things unknown, 
and in between are the doors of perception.
Aldous Huxley
By far the best proof is experience.
Sir Francis Bacon
1. Introduction: Understanding Corruption Perception
Corruption  has  become one of  the  major  issues  in  current  political  debate  in 
Europe and corruption affairs dominate the media coverage in almost any European 
country. In the wake of the economical crisis, corruption has been discussed as one 
of the causes for the huge financial disasters in companies and national economies. 
It is evident that the study of corruption has never been more compellent than now. 
In  recent  years,  the  interest  in  corruption  has  increased  and  the  literature  on 
corruption  has  experienced  a  veritable  boom.  The  negative  consequences  of 
corruption have  been carefully examined and illustrated and the  research  on the 
causes and mechanisms has brought ground-breaking insight (see chapter two for 
details). The criminal nature of the phenomenon and the fact that corruption is a 
crime without an immediate victim has made its study a rather difficult task from the 
very beginning. It seemed that researchers solved this problem with the innovative 
use of commercial country assessments (e.g. Mauro 1995, Lambsdorff 1998). Using 
aggregated  country  data  and  macro  analysis,  international  corruption  research 
celebrated sensational results and caused a stir in the social scientific community in 
the past two decades. During this time, less attention was paid to the fact that all the 
indicators that were used to study corruption were based on individualsʼ subjective 
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perceptions  and  not  on  the  observation  of  actual  behaviour  or  other  objective 
measures. 
Only  recently,  data  has  become  available  to  critically  examine  the  value  of 
corruption perception as an indicator. Social sciences widely discuss the formation 
of perceptions on various issues.  “While few people would be daring enough to 
equate  subjective  perceptions  of  inequality  with objective  inequality  in  society” 
writes  Michael  Smith  (2008:  2)  in  his  study  on  corruption  perception,  “many 
scholars  of  corruption  seem  to  have  little  problem  with  equating  measures  of 
corruption  perceptions  with  the  actual  incidence  of  corruption”.  In  order  to 
undertake research in this question, it is necessary to use individual level data that 
includes both corruption perception and victimization questions. So far, only a few 
studies existed where subjective and objective corruption indicators were included in 
order to examine the interaction between them. Those available will be discussed in 
detail in chapter three. 
All studies on the problem of corruption show that corruption perception strongly 
correlates with various phenomenons we deem socially and politically undesirable, 
like  low economic development,  weak democratic  institutions,  and an  oppressed 
media.  Therefore,  there is  not any question that corruption perception acts  as an 
indicator for certain conditions in society that are hindering economic development 
and the functioning of a liberal and democratic society. But this does not mean that 
the indicator stands for the phenomenon of corruption. More and more studies show 
reasonable doubt that corruption perception acts as an apt indicator for corruption. 
The impressive results of macro studies on corruption are by no means proof that 
they  are  really  measuring  corruption.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  they  show  the 
influence of some sort of social phenomenon, but this phenomenon does not have to 
be  necessarily  corruption.  In  some  countries,  the  figures  for  experience  and 
perception  are  closer  than  in  others.  Many important  questions,  for  instance  the 
targeting and funding of anti-corruption strategies or the role of a critical media, are 
closely  linked  to  the  need  for  valid  corruption  measurements.  Therefore,  it  is 
necessary to undertake more research on the gap between corruption perception and 
corruption experience or victimization. 
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This study focuses on socio-structural determinants of corruption perception and 
the relation between corruption perception and experience. The author will examine 
a dataset from the European Commission that includes 27 European countries, i.e. 
all member states of the European Union (see chapter six). So far, there has not been 
any study that included as many European countries since international comparisons 
included merely a handful of them. This work contributes to the existing literature in 
several ways. The used data include questions about corruption perception and an 
indicator  for  corruption  experience.  Therefore,  the  influence  of  corruption 
experience  on  corruption  perception  can  be  analysed.  Furthermore,  a  number  of 
socio-economic  background  variables  allow  to  gain  better  insight  of  how  the 
formation of corruption perception is influenced by the social structure of a society. 
In this way, research is coming closer to Durkheimʼs paramount rule for the social 
sciences  that  social  phenomenons  should  be  explained  through  nothing  else  but 
social phenomenons. 
 
To pay full attention to the fact that the citizens that were interviewed in the study 
are subject to the influences of very different contexts depending on the country they 
live in, a multilevel regression modelling was chosen as method of analysis. This 
technique meets best the requirements of the specific data structure of cross-country 
studies  containing  individual  level  data.  Besides  individual  level  factors  country 
level parameters were included in the analysis, too. 
This paper finds demonstrative and significant results that help to understand how 
corruption  perception  is  formed  and  how  corruption  perception  and  corruption 
experience  should  be  understood  when  studying  corruption.  It  points  out  the 
influence of socio-structural determinants and the difference between opinion and 
behaviour. Also practical lessons can be learned from these results. Without reliable 
data on corruption, it is rather difficult to evaluate the efficiency of anti-corruption 
activities (e.g. Seligson 2006). Data on corruption perception can be even delusive in 
this  regard.  Wide  discrepancies  between  perception  and  experience  distort  the 
picture of the real situation and make realistic assessments of a country’s situation 
difficult. More corruption perception can even lead to more real corruption. Such 
questions will be treated broader in the conclusion in chapter eight. 
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The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows:  chapter  two  gives  an 
overview about the phenomenon of corruption in general, its definitions, theories, 
consequences and causes. The next chapter (three) will go more into detail about the 
problematic issue of corruption perception and will discuss the existing literature on 
corruption  measurement.  In  chapter  four,  the  hypotheses  of  this  study  will  be 
presented.  Chapter  five  describes  the  data  and  the  operationalization  of  it, 
particularly the construction of an index of corruption perception. In chapter six, a 
multilevel  regression  analysis  is  performed  and  several  models  are  tested.  The 
results are presented in chapter seven. The results and their practical consequences 
for anti-corruption agencies and policy makers will be discussed in the conclusion in 
chapter  eight,  as  well  as  an  outlook  for  future  empirical  work  in  the  field  of 
corruption research. 
2. Corruption: Definitions, Theories, Consequences, 
Causes
This chapter gives an overview about the theoretical framework of corruption in 
order to put this study in a broader context in the field of corruption studies. A short 
introduction will familiarize the reader with the lengthy debate on how to define 
corruption.  Then  theoretical  approaches  towards  corruption  will  be  summarized. 
After  this  follows  an  overview  about  studies  that  shows  the  consequences  of 
corruption in order to underline the general importance of corruption studies. In the 
remaining section of the chapter, the latest findings in the social sciences about the 
probable causes of corruption will be introduced.
2.1 Corruption Definitions
The debate on how to define corruption is very broad (see Johnston 2005 as well 
as  Sandholtz  and Koetzle 2000) and cannot  be fully summarized here.  An exact 
definition  that  serves  the  interests  of  all  scholars  is  yet  to  be  found,  however, 
everyone, scholar or not, has a feeling of what is corrupt and what is not. Therefore, 
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all  of  the  definitions  rotate  around what  can be considered as  a  core  definition: 
corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
Some scholars suggest that definitional problems are much graver than all other 
problems  of  corruption  measurement  (Philp  2006:  50).  Since  any  measurement 
demands  for  variation,  it  also  needs  a  constant  against  which  the  variation  is 
measured. In corruption research this constant is not always rock solid. However, a 
certain  progress  has  been  made  in  bringing  some  kind  of  organisation  into  the 
problem of defining corruption.
Heidenheimer’s (1989: 8) distinction between public opinion-, public office-, and 
public interest-definitions has been called ground-breaking (Kurer 2005: 222) and is 
amongst the most cited categorizations of definitions. Since then, there has hardly 
been any development. New definitions can always be located within the sphere of 
one of these three groups. Public opinion-definitions would call an action corrupt, if 
the public opinion deems it as corrupt. This definition has been originally introduced 
by Scott (1972: 3), but has been quickly rejected as unsatisfactory since there will 
not be any final agreement in the public on what exactly is a corrupt action and what 
is not. However, this definition should not be prematurely rejected. First of all, in 
many countries laws may not be a legitimate point of reference or are in fact made 
by corrupt  administrators  in  order  to  support  their  corrupt  endeavours  (Johnston 
2005:  69).  Secondly,  all  of  today’s  popular  corruption  rankings  are  based  on 
subjective  perceptions  by  the  public  or  certain  parts  of  a  population  and  are 
ultimately deduced from this type of definitions (Kurer 2005: 224). Certain scientist 
obviously conclude that there is substantive understanding among the general public 
about  what  is  to  be considered as  corruption.  The German corruption researcher 
Allemann (2005: 14) even goes as far as calling corruption a “perception crime”: it 
is not only the real existing corruption that matters, but also acts and practices that 
are  perceived  as  corrupt.  For  practical  research,  this  is  where  the  problems  of 
operationalization start since it is almost impossible to find a measurable agreement 
on what is corrupt. This study illustrates this dilemma with impressive figures: 78,1 
% of the European population believe that corruption is a major problem in their 
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country, but only 9,4 % have actually experienced corruption, when defined as the 
demand for a bribe or the actual payment of a bribe.
Now,  public  office-definitions  can  be  considered  as  more  objective.  The 
definition proposed by Nye (1967:  419)  has found wide prevalence in academic 
literature:  “Corruption  is  behaviour  which  deviates  from the  formal  duties  of  a 
public  role  because  of  private-regarding  (personal,  close  family,  private  clique) 
pecuniary or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence”. This definition underlines that corruption implies the 
breaking of rules. Its operationalization is easier in a theoretical way: the breaking of 
rules can be observed, as well as the consequences of the rule-breaking in terms of 
legal activities. 
Rose-Ackerman  (1978:  6)  uses  a  definition  of  corruption  that  also  includes 
payments not conflicting with formal law. She points out that the principal-agent 
model does not necessarily mean that “the principal’s goals have been subverted”, 
which is still a widespread assumption. “Indeed, the payment may even increase the 
principal’s  satisfaction  with  the  agent’s  performance”.  The  tip  to  a  waiter,  for 
instance, may increase the quality of his or her service, as well as the bribe to a low-
ranking officer may speed up the processing of applications, which would not be the 
case  with  colleagues  who  work  on  their  regular  salary.  She  even  includes 
contributions for legal lobbying because she finds that they are having very similar 
effects on the economic behaviour of agents. In fact in her model, a poorly informed 
public  causes  less  corruption,  but  more  influence  by  lobbyists  since  it  is  not 
necessary to hide support (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 55). Her definition includes “all 
payments to agents that are not passed onto superiors” (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 7). 
The advantage of the public office approach – the fact that it is based on legal 
rules – is also its  disadvantage.  Johnston (2005: 68) asks about the definition of 
abuse in the behaviour-focused public office-definitions. Those definitions referring 
to  formal  rules,  like the law,  have the advantage of being relatively precise and 
remain  broadly  applicable.  But  over  time,  laws  change  and  are  subject  to  the 
interpretation of lawyers and judges. If an act is not explicitly illegal, it still might be 
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adverse to public interest,  for instance causing serious loss of public property, or 
simply  be  considered  as  illegitimate.  For  example,  giving  consultants  heavily 
overpriced  consultancy  or  project  development  contracts  in  the  process  of 
privatization of state enterprises has been a common practice in many countries. 
Another  example  is  the  OECD (1997) convention against  bribing  foreign public 
officials, which turned a formerly completely legal act (payments were even tax-
deductible) into an illegal practice in its member states. At this stage, the public 
opinion-definition  comes  into  play  again,  which  defines  corruption  as  what  is 
considered to be corrupt. 
An attempt to solve the dilemma was to focus on the damage of public interest. In 
this  approach,  the  above example  of  overpriced  consultancy  contracts  could  be 
categorized as being against public interest,  as well  as many forms of lobbying. 
Obviously, defining and balancing public interest in the right way is hardly possible. 
Therefore, this road has been left again. 
Smith and Mateju (2009: 3) suggest an innovative and promising compromise in 
the  emotional  discussion  on  the  definition  of  corruption.  They  argue  that 
Wittgenstein’s  concept  of  “family  resemblances”  outlined  in  his  Philosophical  
Investigations (Wittgenstein  1999)  could  be  helpful  for  solving  this  problem. 
Wittgenstein  argues  that  many  concepts  in  philosophy  and  science  cannot  be 
thoroughly  defined.  But  still,  through  overlapping  resemblances  or  features,  a 
meaningful communication process is possible, even if researchers do not have final 
definitions of the terms they use. The same is true for corruption. Everyone has an 
idea what it is and researchers have found enough common working definitions and 
a shared vocabulary to continue with their work, no matter if the ultimate set of 
well-defined terms has not been found yet.
For this work, the decision on how to define corruption has already been made. 
The  questions  in  the  study set  the  framework.  Those  parts  of  the  questionnaire 
measuring  corruption  perception  use  a  public  opinion  approach:  the  question  of 
defining corruption and what to include in the concept is left to the respondent. In 
16
the other part of the questions, where the experience of a case of corruption is asked, 
corruption has been reduced to the demand for a bribe. 
Definitions should always be a mean to work with and not an end in itself. Still, 
this problem has to be kept in mind, when putting the results into a broader context. 
Societies, where bribery is not demanded before an act, but ex post gift giving is 
practised as a procedure of exchange, are clearly in disadvantage when measuring 
corruption through bribery. Putting other measurement problems aside, it should also 
be noted that this definition will leave a lot of corruption deals aside, especially, 
where  the  demands  for  bribery  are  not  directly  formulated,  but  more  elaborate 
constructions are used for exchanging power, goods, and money. 
2.2 Corruption Theories
The question of corruption theory is just as heavily debated as the question of its 
definition. It is not in the focus of this paper since the discussion will later shift to 
the  problems  of  measuring  corruption.  For  the  sake  of  completeness  a  short 
summary about the various fields of theory is given. It mainly follows the overviews 
of Allemann (2005) and Maravić (2006).
They  (Allemann  2005:  27,  Maravić 2006:  101)  distinguish  four  fields  of 
corruption  theory:  1)  corruption  from  a  system  theoretical  point  of  view,  2) 
corruption as deviant behaviour, 3) an economic theory of corruption, and 4) a neo-
institutional approach towards corrupt behaviour. 
Following  Luhmann,  the  system  theoretical  approach  sees  corruption  as  the 
exchange  of  information  beyond  the  boarders  of  two  different  communication 
systems  and  their  respective  functional  logic.  Communication  within  the 
communication  system  “economy”  follows  the  paradigm  of  efficiency  versus 
inefficiency.  Communication  within  the  system  called  “politics”  follows  the 
paradigm of powerful versus powerless.  Typically,  corruption is  the exchange of 
money  (mean  of  exchange  in  the  economic  system)  against  power  (mean  of 
exchange in the political system). Following this logic, corruption is the misuse of 
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one mean of exchange for a different logic (Hiller 2005: 61). A corrupt democracy 
does not follow democratic principles, a corrupt legal system does not follow the 
paradigm legal/illegal, and a corrupt economic system does not observe the market 
mechanism. 
The theory of corruption as deviant behaviour stems from Merton’s theory of 
deviance. Corruption is seen as behaviour which does not follow existing norms and 
values. It does not mean, however, that the individual deliberately seeks to violate 
those rules, but rather that it finds itself in a conflict of benefit versus value (Max 
Weberʼs  Zweckrationalität  versus  Wertrationalität).  Deviant  behaviour,  therefore, 
acts as an indicator of societal dysfunctionality since the individual is not any longer 
able  to  satisfy  the  expectations  towards  his  roles.  Conceived  in  general  terms, 
corruption  serves  as  a  societal  indicator  of  structural  dysfunctionalities.  In  the 
theories of transitional societies, this approach has been promoted in the sixties and 
seventies by the likes of Samuel Huntington (1968). His theory that corruption was 
enabling change towards democracy and market economy in transition countries was 
disproved later on by both social scientists and economists (e.g. Mauro 1995, Rose-
Ackerman 1999). 
 
The  most  popular  theory  of  corruption  is  the  economical  approach  called 
economics of corruption. One of the most important works in this field was the one 
of Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978). The boom of corruption studies is build on the use 
of  the  theory  of  economics  of  corruption.  It  follows  widely  the  rational  choice 
theory.  The  theory  of  economics  of  corruption  studies  how a  person  decides  in 
certain situations in favour  of corruption.  The focus point of this  analysis  is  the 
individual actin corrupt if the gains outweigh the costs. Klitgaard (1988: 75) puts 
this  concept  in  a  simple  equation:  corruption  =  monopoly  +  discretion  – 
accountability. Further elements of this theoretical sphere are the rent seeking theory 
and the transaction cost theory, which treat both asymmetric relations of actors in 
economic transactions.
The  neo-institutional  approach  (March  and  Olsen  1989)  developed  from 
organization studies. According to the neo-institutional approach, institutions give 
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the individual a sense of meaning and demonstrate the right pattern of behaviour. 
Through structuring the interpretation of reality, institutions reduce the uncertainty 
of  actors  in  given  situations  of  decision.  Institutions  are  so  powerful  since  the 
individual does not perceive any alternative ways of action. According to the theory, 
people do not follow their daily working routine, because they are told so or because 
they mean to gain the highest profits by it, but simply because they cannot perceive 
any alternative behaviour. The right behaviour passes on through imitation. In this 
way,  corruption is  passed on from higher  ranking officials  or managers onto the 
lower ranks of an institution. 
A  new  and  interesting  way  of  fusioning  paradigms  can  be  found  in  the 
combination of institutionalism and the rational choice theory (Maravić 2006). It 
tries to show that the individual is acting within an institution, restricted by its rules 
and values, but in an actual situation, it has to decide in consideration of his gains or 
losses.  The aim is to identify neuralgic positions in an institution,  where corrupt 
behaviour might accumulate rather than trying to find “bad apples”, i.e. assumably 
potentially corrupt employees, in order to remove them. Already, Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) could show that it it  is not necessarily the person, but rather the situation 
which creates corruption. She shows how different economical models can predict 
the  risk  of  corruption  in  a  given  bureaucratic  environment  due  to  certain 
organizational structures.
2.3 Consequences of Corruption
The harmful consequences of corruption are well documented by now. Since this 
study is  dealing  with  the  question  of  measuring  corruption,  it  has  to  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  majority  of  the  research  quoted  here  has  used  corruption 
perception as indicator for corruption. This indicator has some shortcomings, which 
will be discussed later. Therefore, one has to assess the following results with care or 
consider them as preliminary as long as better ways of measuring corruption have 
not been applied.
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Mauro (1995) was the first to show a negative connection between corruption and 
growth empirically, as well as between investment rates, using data from an index of 
the  business  consultant  company  Business  International.  His  study  included  67 
countries. Mauro (1995: 683) calculated that if Bangladesh would lower its level of 
corruption to Uruguay’s, its investment rate would increase by approximately five 
percent  of  its  GDP.  Several  other  authors  get  similar  findings  confirming  the 
negative impact of corruption on the ratio of investment to GDP: Brunetti, Kisunko, 
and Weder (1998) are able to show this with an index by the World Bank and the  
University of Basel in a dataset of 41 countries. Mauro (1997) comes to similar 
conclusions with data from the Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk 
Guide  and a  sample  of  94 countries,  as  well  as  Gymiah-Brempong (2002)  with 
African data.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993: 616) were able to show that due to its 
secret nature, corruption diverts money to potentially valueless fields of investment, 
if procurement in this field is specifically secret. This feature is particularly true for 
the defence sector and major infrastructure projects. Areas which are more valuable 
on the long run, like education or health, become discriminated. Seligson (2002: 
410) shows empirical evidence that corruption is disadvantageous for the economy 
and society: bribe leads to the loss of tax money. Those who can pay bribes get 
public  services  others  will  not  get,  therefore  leading  to  even  more  inequality. 
Corruption weakens the rule of law: legal and commercial standards are disregarded, 
subsequently  lowering  the  quality  of  products  and  leading  to  the  neglect  of 
ecological guidelines. 
In social sciences and the studies of development, there has been a tradition of 
positively  assessing  corruption.  This  thinking  is  closely  linked  to  the  name  of 
Samuel Huntington (1968), who claimed corruption would create more efficiency 
and would hold unstable political systems together. Rose-Ackerman (1999), among 
many  others,  ended  these  myths  about  the  desirable  effects  of  corruption.  Her 
research showed that corruption leads to the formation of cartels and monopolies, to 
a distortion of competition, and hinders the development and welfare of a country.
The following paragraphs, as well as the paragraphs in the next section, mostly 
refer  to  studies  compiled  in  an  article  by Johann Graf  von Lambsdorff  (2005a) 
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giving  an  extensive  overview  about  several  dozen  empirical  findings  on  the 
consequences of corruption.1 Many of these studies use the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) from the anti-corruption NGO Transparency International (TI), which 
has been developed by Lambsdorff.2 Besides the indices already mentioned, this has 
become the most popular index measuring corruption perception. The launch of the 
index in 1995 has literally fuelled cross-country research. Since then, also a lot of 
critical research has focused on the index (e.g. Thompson and Shah 2005), as well as 
the problems of measuring corruption through perception in general (see chapter 
three).
Several studies confirm that corruption reduces foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and  local  investment  even  stronger  (Rose-Ackerman  1999:  2,  see  Lambsdorff 
2005a: 4 for several studies). Other capital inflow than FDI is also very likely to be 
reduced by corruption (Lambsdorff 2005a: 6). Wei (2000) finds that an increase in 
corruption from the low level of Singapore to the high level of Mexico is equivalent 
to raising the tax rate by over 20 percentage points (of course without gaining tax 
revenues  for  state  investment).  Lambsdorff  (2005b)  shows,  however,  that  grand 
corruption does not deter foreign investors as strongly as petty corruption does. 
Many studies, some of them represented in Lambsdorff (2005a: 7) are testing the 
correlation between corruption and GDP (per capita), but have difficulties to show a 
direct  connection between those two. Despite  extensive research this  causality is 
contested  by  many.  Similarly,  there  are  many  hints  that  the  growth  of  GDP is 
negatively affected by corruption. Due to measurement problems (for instance with 
high multicollinearity in the predictors) iron-clad evidence is still missing.
The influence of corruption on income inequality could have been shown more 
clearly. Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) find in a study of 37 countries a 
positive  impact  of  corruption  on  inequality  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient. 
Gymiah-Brempong (2002) confirms this connection with an African sample. Others 
1 For other summaries see Treisman 2007, Svensson 2005, or Andvig/Fjeldstad 2001.
2 For a current version and the methodology of the index see 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 (16.11.2010).
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contest  the  direction  of  the  causality  between  corruption  and  inequality  (see 
Lambsdorff  2005a:  9).  Some sort  of  interplay forming a  vicious  circle  is  rather 
probable. High levels of corruption are further found to be correlated with inefficient 
government services, lower government expenditure on education (since it is not as 
profitable for corruption as other fields), higher spending on military expenditure, 
lower tax revenues, environmental pollution, and crime (Lambsdorff 2005a: 13). 
After declaring corruption illegal, it is the mere fact of illegality that produces 
economic  inefficiencies.  Transactions  have  to  be  kept  secret  and  anti-corruption 
measures have to be enforced. “Moreover, a corrupt system of government services 
has the distributional disadvantage of benefiting unscrupulous people at the expense 
of law-abiding citizens who would be willing to purchase the service legally” (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 8). From the viewpoint of political science, corruption shows that 
political  competition does  not  always  lead to  the suggested  balance  of  interests. 
What economists know as “market failure” can be shown with corruption for the 
political sphere.
2.4 Causes of Corruption
Finding a robust causal relationship between corruption and its causes is almost 
impossible. Many consequences of corruption may often be its very reasons. Higher 
barriers to market entry, policy intervention, and the vagueness of the application of 
government  regulations  have  been  found  to  positively  impact  corruption 
(Lambsdorff 2005a: 16). But the causality is still uncertain since all these measures 
could have just as well been implemented by corrupt officials in order to get money 
out  of  bureaucratic  processes.  Generally  speaking,  market  competition  has  been 
found to have an adverse impact on corruption. The studies of Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Treisman (2000), and Leite and Weidmann (1999) have indicated this, using 
as indicator the number of years a country has been open to trade. Using as another 
indicator of openness  the number of international organizations a country has an 
affiliation with and the period of time a country has been member of the United 
Nations, GATT/WTO, and the IMF, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) come to the same 
conclusion. 
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Opposite  to popular belief,  the level  of salaries  does not have any impact  on 
corruption. Swamy et al. (2001), Treisman (2000), and Manow (2005) cannot find 
clear results, which would support this argument. The fact that government salaries 
are higher in poor countries relative to GDP is an argument against wages being a 
reason for corruption. 
Arguments in favour of press freedom reducing corruption are strong. Several 
studies measuring press freedom through the indices of the NGO Freedom House or 
the number of newspapers point in this direction (Lambsdorff 2005a: 19). 
The influence of democracy is more complicated. The simple fact of having a 
democratic regime does not reduce corruption. It is the length of time a democracy 
has been in place (Treisman 2000, Gerring and Thacker 2004, 2005), as well as its 
quality that count. Authoritarian regimes have slightly less corruption than medium-
democratic  regimes,  but  good  democracies  have  the  lowest  level  of  corruption 
(Manow  2005).  Several  studies  (Gerring  and  Thacker  2004,  for  others  see 
Lambsdorff  2005a: 23)  find presidential  democracies more corruption-prone than 
parliamentarian democracies. No empirical arguments have been found to establish a 
conclusive  connection  between  government  expenses  or  government  size  and 
corruption. The size of population, another popular argument, is not such a clear 
case either,  as well  as the extent of centralization versus federalism (Lambsdorff 
2005a: 15). 
Several studies use data from the World Value Survey to examine a connection 
between trust in a society and its level of corruption. They come to the conclusion 
that a higher level of trust reduces corruption (La Porta et al. 1997, Adsera, Boix, 
and Payne 2000) and some are even able to confirm the causality in this direction 
(Uslaner  2004).  A mentality  favourable  to  hierarchies  is  increasing  corruption 
according to Husted (1999). 
Studies  by Swamy et  al.  (2001)  show female  gender  as  a  reducing factor  of 
corruption, but others contest this fact by saying that other variables like the rule of 
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law,  freedom,  and  democracy  reduce  the  initial  influence  (see  Lambsdorff 
2005a: 26).
 When looking at  religion,  Protestantism is  widely seen as a factor reduceing 
corruption. Even when controlling for GDP and democracy, Treisman (2000: 427) 
finds  that  Protestantism  reduces  corruption  significantly.  In  a  conservative 
estimation, Ireland would have one point less on the CPI 10-point scale, if its share 
of Protestants was as high as that of Denmark and it would rise in the ranking to 
about the level of Denmark. Other studies confirm his findings (Gerring and Thacker 
2005:  245-246,  for  others  see  Lambsdorff  2005a:  24),  but  have  a  reduced 
significance when adding openness as a factor. 
Four  hypotheses  on the influence  of  Protestantism are presented by Treisman 
(2000: 427): Firstly, Protestantism has a culture that shows “greater tolerance for 
challenges to authority” and for “individual dissent” (Treisman 2000: 427). Thus, it 
favours  the  discovery  and  punishment  of  official  abuse.  Secondly,  Protestants 
believe, roughly speaking, that individuals are personally responsible for avoiding 
sins, unlike other Christian denominations emphasizing human weakness and the 
need  for  the  church  to  forgive  (Lipset  and  Lenz  2006).  Thirdly,  Protestantism 
focuses  more  on  the  individual  compared  to  other  religions.  In  cultures  where 
Protestantism is absent this leads subsequently to familism and nepotism. Fourthly 
in Protestant countries, greater emphasis is put on the separation of church and state. 
This fact leads to a civil society that enjoys greater independence and is, therefore, 
better equipped to control the state. 
Critical  studies  contest  the  view  that  Protestants  are  less  corrupt.  Rose  and 
Mishler (2008: 21) found that although a high share of Protestantism in a country 
correlates  negatively  with  the  aggregated  level  of  perceived  corruption  and 
Protestants perceive less corruption on an individual level, they are personally more 
involved in acts of corruption than members of other denominations. According to 
their study, this is due to the fact that they have more contacts and, therefore, have 
more occasions for corruption than others. 
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Dreher  and  Schneider  (2009)  find  signs,  that  the  shadow economy increases 
corruption in low income countries, but does not have an influence or even reduces 
the  amount  of  corruption  in  high  income  countries  since  corruption  has  a 
substitutional role in high income countries and a complementary role in low income 
countries. 
At the end of this chapter, it has to be emphasized again that the majority of the 
above  mentioned  studies  have  used  corruption  perception  as  an  indicator  for 
corruption. This procedure can be questioned. To discuss this question more deeply, 
the  next  chapter  fully  deals  with  the  problem of  measuring  corruption  through 
perception. It will also introduce alternative measurements. 
3.  Measuring  Corruption  Through  Perception?  New 
Critical Studies
Already a  number  of  studies  suggests  that  there  are  several  factors  that  bias 
corruption  perception  and  render  it  a  questionable  indicator  for  a  real  level  of 
corruption. Contrary to most corruption studies, which analyse aggregated country 
scores, these studies use individual level data. Until recently, Micro level data has 
not been used in the field of corruption studies. With new datasets available, more 
and more researcher  have  now concentrated on the  individual  level,  giving  new 
insights into the phenomenon of corruption,  which have not been available  with 
country  level  studies  alone.  All  studies  relevant  to  the  question  of  measuring 
corruption through perception have only been released within the last five years. Up 
to the author’s knowledge, there has not been any detailed account of these studies 
so  far,  a  fact  that  has  hopefully  changed  with  the  completion  of  the  following 
section.  There,  the current state of research will be discussed in more detail and 
conclusions will be drawn for the subsequent analysis of European data.
Olken  (2006)  started  the  recent  discussion  with  a  very innovative  attempt  to 
measure  corruption.  He invented  an objective  measure  of  corruption  in  order  to 
compare  it  to  corruption  perceptions.  In  his  study,  which  was  conducted  in  the 
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context  of  a  governmental  road-building  programme  in  rural  Indonesia  in  477 
villages,  he  is  able  to  show  significant  biases  between  reported  corruption  and 
corruption  measured  by  his  alternative  measure.  For  this  objective  indicator, 
engineers  analysed  the  roads  constructed  in  the  project  and  looked  whether  the 
originally indicated amount of material was actually used or not. In this way, they 
constructed  a  variable  for  missing  expenditure.  In  a  parallel  household  survey, 
villagers were asked about corruption in the project, in their village, and in Indonesia 
in general. Controlling for village effects and the objective level of corruption, the 
level  of  corruption perception  could be  predicted through education  and gender: 
higher educated respondents and male respondents reported more corruption (Olken 
2006: 22). The results are not only significant, but have a strong effect as well: each 
year  of  education  a  respondent  had  acquired  raised  the  likeliness  of  reporting 
corruption by 0,7 to 0,9 percentage points. 
Furthermore, he found that higher ethnic heterogeneity created a higher perceived 
level of corruption. Higher levels of participation in social activities produced lower 
levels of perceived corruption. Both results are in line with the literature. Mauro 
(1995) and La Porta et al. (1999) show the association between ethnic heterogeneity 
and corruption and Putnam (1993) shows that more participation in social activities 
is  connected  with  less  corruption.  Olken,  however,  examines  the  association 
between the actual level of corruption (indicated through the missing expenditure 
variable) and ethnic heterogeneity and social participation. He finds that ethnically 
heterogeneous villages  have  higher  perceived corruption levels,  but  lower actual 
levels of missing expenditures. Social participation does not have any association 
with the missing expenditures variable at all. Olken (2006: 3) explains the results 
with effects on the level of interpersonal trust in the villages. 
Olken (2006: 22) also presents a number of other biases: controlling for the level 
of  corruption,  less  corruption  was  reported  by  those,  who  were  involved  in 
discussions that were likely to touch the issue of the road building project, those that  
lived close to the project, and those that were related with the project manager. 
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Donchev and Ujhelyi (2008) have been among the first researchers to use a cross-
country micro level dataset to examine corruption perceptions.  They compare 58 
countries  at  the  aggregate  and  at  the  individual  level.  The  data  come  from the 
International Crime and Victimization Survey (ICVS) by the United Nations. The 
datasets  are  from  1996/97  and  2000/01.  Donchev/Ujhelyi  (2008:  3)  find  that 
education,  age,  income,  and  state  of  employment  have  effects  on  corruption 
perception while controlled for experience. They show that corruption experience 
does not have a significant effect on corruption perception. 
On the aggregate level factors like GDP, percentage of Protestants, a British legal 
tradition (common law), federalism, a long tradition of democracy, and a  natural 
resource endowment have stronger effects on corruption perception. This leads them 
to  the  conclusion  that  “the  perception  index is  systematically biased  away from 
experience”  (Donchev/Ujhelyi  2008: 12).  On the individual level better  educated 
respondents and students report  more corruption when controlled for experience. 
Age has  a  non-linear  effect  on corruption  perception  with  positive influence  for 
young people declineing with increasing age, becoming negative at the age of 50 
(Donchev/Ujhelyi  2008:  21).  Being  in  the  top  25  % income  bracket  and  being 
employed has a significant positive influence on corruption perception, while living 
in a large city has a negative one (Donchev/Ujhelyi 2008: 21). They found another 
surprising result: not only that corruption perception is influenced by several socio-
economic  factors,  corruption  experience  has  also  a  weaker  effect  on  corruption 
perception than age, education, income, and state of employment (Donchev/Ujhelyi 
2008: 3). 
A similar analysis of the 2000 dataset of the ICVS was done by Bonvin (2008). 
The major outcome was the description of large discrepancies between levels of 
corruption perception and corruption experience. The finding of Donchev/Ujhelyi 
(2008: 21) that people from a higher income strata perceive more corruption was 
confirmed  (Bonvin  2008:  31),  but  their  results  for  age  are  contradictory  with 
Bonvin’s finding that younger respondents perceive less corruption.  
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In  another  cross-country  study,  Michael  Smith  (2008)  used  data  from  the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). With micro level data from the Role 
of  Government  IV survey  from 2006,  he  compared  15  countries.  Compared  to 
similar surveys, the ISSP provides much more background variables. In this way, 
Smith (2008: 4) is able to show a strong effect of social status, trust,  number of 
contacts,  and political  attitude on corruption perception.  With income, education, 
and the self-assessed social status, he created a socio-economic status variable.
His key finding is the observation that “the strength and direction of the effects of 
social status are different in different countries” (Smith 2008: 4). That means that in 
countries with a low level of perceived corruption, being poor and little educated 
results in higher corruption perception than the average, while in countries with a 
high level of perceived corruption respondents with the same features perceive less 
corruption  than  the  average.  With  raising  corruption,  social  differences  become 
unimportant since more and more people perceive corruption. In countries with a 
high level of perceived corruption, only people with higher social status are able to 
perceive the real scale of corruption and assess the negative influence on society 
(Smith 2008: 12). Smith’s assumption is that social status effects people in countries 
with  a  low level  of  perceived  corruption  by  giving  them a  resentment  towards 
society  and  politics  and  a  feeling  of  exclusion.  Furthermore  gender,  age,  and 
community are other influential factors in his study.
Rose/Mishler (2008) use individual level data from another corruption study by 
TI, the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB). Contrary to the CPI, the GCB surveys 
the  general  public  and  includes  also  a  question  on  corruption  experience. 
Rose/Mishler (2008) analyse 60 countries from the 2006 dataset and find disparities 
between  corruption  perception  and  corruption  experience.  They  show  that 
perceptions  of  corruption  in  specific  institutions  are  only  weakly  influenced  by 
experiences  with  those  institutions,  but  are  much  more  influenced  by perceived 
corruption in other institutions in a circular way, which they call echo chamber effect 
(Rose/Mishler  2008:  2).  This  problem  “arises  when  perceptions  of  national 
corruption in a country are shaped by historical stereotypes or media reports and 
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then recorded by CPI or CCI3 as ‘fact’. These data then feedback, reinforcing elite 
and  mass  perceptions  of  corruption  and  creating  a  vicious  cycle  creating  the 
appearance  of  reliability  (i.e.,  high  inter-indicator  correlations)  without  ensuring 
validity”  (Rose/Mishler  2008:  10).  They  suggest  to  further  rely  on  corruption 
experience measures. However, perceptions are not only less likely to be influenced 
by  actual  experiences.  On  the  contrary,  they  also  bias  the  recall  of  corruption 
experiences. 
Through  a  multilevel  model  Rose/Mishler  (2008:  5)  are  able  to  show  that 
perceptions are heavily influenced by media reports and that corruption experience 
is more a result of individual opportunities and motivations. Rose/Mishler (2008: 9) 
find the reliability of public reports of street level corruption problematic without 
controlling for the contacts citizens actually have with officials.4 “These criticisms 
challenge  the  assumption  that  individual  perceptions  are  shaped  primarily  by 
experience and suggests, instead, that the ‘experience’ of corruption may reflect both 
normative and empirical expectations or perceptions” (Rose/Mishler 2008: 11). 
They also point out some general considerations about the work with corruption 
perception  measurement:  “The  incompatibility  of  corruption  perception  with  the 
experience of  corruption at  the aggregate level  is  troubling from a measurement 
theory perspective. If perceptions and experience are valid measures of the same 
underlying phenomenon, they should be highly correlated and respond to many of 
the same causal influences” (Rose/Mishler 2008: 11). But on the individual level 
corruption perception and corruption experience are even more weakly correlated 
than at the aggregate level (Rose/Mishler 2008: 5).
 Another  particularly  interesting  result  is  their  finding  on  the  influence  of 
Protestantism:  in  line  with  previous  studies,  Protestants  are  much  less  likely  to 
perceive political institutions as corrupt and moderately less likely to perceive street-
level  institutions  (police,  school  officials,  doctors)  as  corrupt.  But  Rose/Mishler 
3 Note by the author: Control of Corruption Index by the World Bank
4 Whether the respondent actually were in contact with the institution or not, has been subsequently included 
in the GCB.
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(2008: 23) find Protestants slightly more likely to pay bribes on the street-level. This 
finding about cultural implications of corruption perception and corruption practice 
might spur future discussion about this issue. 
Abramo (2005:2)  analysed  individual  data  from the  GCB 2004  and come  to 
similar  conclusions  as  Rose/Mishler  (2008).  Comparing  60  countries,  he  finds 
experience is not a good predictor of corruption perception.5 However, he finds a 
strong correlation  between  opinions  about  corruption  and opinions  about  human 
rights. 
Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) look on the interplay of corruption perceptions 
and the level of corruption in a representative survey of 2 600 Ukrainians. There, the 
size  of  the  population  of  the  respondent’s  community  played  a  role 
(Čábelková/Hanousek 2004: 390), although with inconsistent results. Respondents 
in  towns  with  a  population  of  200 000  to  500 000  citizens  saw  governmental 
organisations as more corrupt,  while  people from smaller  or bigger  communities 
perceived  less  corruption.  In  a  number  of  political  institutions,  people  without 
employment perceived more corruption than the employed (Čábelková/Hanousek 
2004: 391). The influence of gender and age was not clear. The main result was that 
stronger corruption perception leads to a greater willingness to pay bribes.
Seligson (2006) is another researcher who questions the link between perception 
and experience.  With data from the Vanderbilt  University Latin American Public 
Opinion Project, he is able to show that the impact of experience on perception is 
very small. The case of El Salvador is spectacular. There, those who experienced the 
most cases of corruption,  perceived even slightly less corruption than those who 
experienced only one case of corruption (Seligson 2006: 389). He underlines that in 
countries in which a major effort to reduce corruption has been successful, it may 
well be that the anti-corruption campaign heightens awareness of corrupt practices 
and, therefore, might produce an increase in the perception of corruption precisely at 
the time when actual corruption is declining (Seligson 2006: 390). In a similar vein, 
5 In the 2004 edition of the GCB the question for corruption experience asked for corruption in general. In 
later editions corruption experience was asked separately for various groups.
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it  is  problematic  to  use  aggregate  data  of  a  country  in  order  to  measure  the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption programmes, especially, when they aim on certain 
demographic, social, or occupational groups (Seligson 2006: 386). There is evident 
danger of stepping into the trap of an ecological fallacy. 
More evidence that corruption experience does not effect corruption perception 
can be  found in the extensive  study on corruption in  Eastern  Europe by Miller, 
Grodeland, and Koshechkina (2001:  91).  They studied corruption perception and 
experience with  focus  groups in  the Ukraine,  Bulgaria,  Slovakia,  and the  Czech 
Republic.  Although,  public  perceptions  of  officials  were extremely negative,  the 
actual experiences were far less negative indicating a gap between perception and 
experience.
Duncan (2006) gives  a  detailed  overview of  non-perception  measurements  of 
corruption where he also underlines the advantages of victimization or experience 
measurements. He reminds us, however, that such studies are mostly limited to petty 
corruption.
In a critical discussion of the CPI Thompson and Shah (2005: 17) point out a 
general argument about problems of corruption perception measurement. Average 
citizens,  on  the  one  hand,  will  always  have  problems  assessing  the  level  of 
corruption in their  country since they cannot have full  knowledge of the various 
situations in all participating countries. Also, they might judge corruption relative to 
other problems in their own country, like the crime rate or education issues. It also 
has to be considered that different respondents might compare corruption problems 
with different ethical standards. What one respondent deems as acceptable, another 
would declare as corrupt. The framework for this assessment might be a question of 
cultural background. A high level of corruption could simply be the result of high 
ethical standards. This problem should be kept in mind when looking at the analysis 
of the data in this study. 
Experts,  on the other  hand,  are  mostly expatriate  professionals.  Assessing the 
situation  in  a  country  adequately  is  difficult  since  their  native  cultural  view 
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unknowingly influences their analysis  (Thompson/Shah 2005: 17). Others criticize 
that expert opinions are often likely to be second-hand reports or hearsay and that 
the expert’s knowledge only covers a certain economic sector. Furthermore, experts 
will not have as much knowledge about street corruption (police, school officials, 
doctors) as normal citizens, but will focus their analysis more on medium- or high-
level corruption. In this way, the corruption picture becomes blurred. 
TI argues that they responded to such critique with the development of different 
indices highlighting different issues. The CPI contributes expert views in order to 
allow cross-country comparison.  The assumption  is  that  they are  close  to  actual 
incidences of corruption or to reliable sources and that they can assess the value of 
their information (Lambsdorff 1998: 89). The cultural over-representation by outside 
expert opinions is eliminated through the inclusion of resident expert assessments. 
Some of the data these analysts produce is sold to investors in order to enable them 
to assess country risks for their investments. Therefore, these data can be regarded as 
the  market’s  choice  of  a  worthwhile  indicator  of  corruption  (see  also  Ades  and 
Di Tella  1996  and  Mauro  1995:  684).  Thus,  many  researchers  consider  these 
assessments as valid indicators of actual levels of corruption. The high correlations 
of the various sources constituting the meta index of the CPI are taken as another 
indicator that the CPI is measuring the actual level of corruption. 
With the GCB, the average citizen’s view is analysed in order to shed light on 
petty corruption and the general public’s view. The high correlation between the CPI 
(expert  survey)  and  the  GCB  (public  opinion  poll)  is  taken  as  a  sign  of  just 
assessments by TI. This leads them to the assumption that “the perception of what is 
regarded as corruption is more global than many thought it might be” (Lambsdorff 
1998: 89). As third tool, TI invented the Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) to pay attention 
to the side of the bribe givers. The BPI’s aim is to measure the likelihood of firms 
from the world’s industrialised countries to bribe abroad. All three indices together – 
the CPI, the GCB, and the BPI – should constitute a balanced picture of corruption 
in the world. 
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It became clear that corruption perception is influenced by various factors and 
should be seen very critically. Many scholars even regard it as unfit for corruption 
research. However, it shows that the ongoing research finds various results, which 
are  not  always  consistent.  Whether  corruption  perception  is  only  an  aggregated 
measure of opinions or whether it also includes experiences of corruption by the 
respondent itself, has not been fully clarified so far. As a next step, hypotheses will 
be  formulated  from some  of  the  findings,  as  well  as  from those  questions  that 
research has not answered yet. 
4. Hypotheses
In this chapter the hypotheses of this study will be presented. The hypotheses 
derive  from  the  literature  on  the  measurement  of  corruption  discussed  in  the 
previous  chapter.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  a  full-fledged  theory  of  corruption 
perception or corruption measurement does not exist so far. In fact, there are several 
theoretical approaches criticising methodological issues and explaining sociological 
problems of  the measurement  of corruption.  The working hypotheses,  which are 
proposed here, are taken rather from the findings of empirical research than from a 
well-developed theory. 
A recurrent theme in this discussion is the proposed correlation between social 
status and corruption perception (Donchev/Ujhelyi 2008, Bonvin 2008, Smith 2008), 
as  well  as  between  education  and  corruption  perception  (e.g.  Olken  2006, 
Donchev/Ujhelyi 2008, Smith 2008). Those correlations are seen as more important 
for the formation of corruption perception than the actual experience of corruption. 
Smith (2008) generally attests a negative correlation between social status and 
corruption perception. But, after analysing the data in more detail, he found out that 
the socio-economic status has a different influence depending on the general level of 
perceived corruption in a country. If the corruption level seems low, like for instance 
in Finland, people with a lower social status see more corruption than the average. 
He proposes the thesis  that they feel excluded from society. Their motto could be 
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summarized as: “Those at the top, they are all corrupt!” In countries with high levels 
of perceived corruption, the idea is that people with a higher social status have more 
information, which enables them to assess the actual influence of corruption in a 
more realistic way and also to understand the harmful nature of corruption more 
deeply. Therefore, they estimate more corruption than the average.
The results on the influence on corruption perception caused by education are 
contradictory. On the one hand, Olken (2006: 22) and Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) 
find that higher educated people tend to report more corruption. On the other hand, 
the findings from Smith (2008) could point in a different direction. The social status 
in  his  analysis  is  negatively correlated  with  corruption  perception.  In  the  social 
status variable that he constructs education is included as one of three components. 
The  finding  that  social  status  has  a  different  effect  on  corruption  perception 
according to the general level of corruption perception in a country could, therefore, 
explain the differing results  for  education,  because Olken (2006) uses data  from 
Indonesia, a country with a high corruption perception level ranking on place 111 
out of 180 on the 2009 CPI. Therefore, Indonesia is a country where social status 
would  in  fact  have  a  positive  correlation  with  corruption  perception.  The  same 
could, subsequently, be true for education. It might turn out that education has a 
similar effect as social status: a different influence depends on the general level of 
corruption perception in a country. 
European countries generally have a low level of corruption. Therefore, education 
should have a generally negative influence on corruption perception. Those at the 
bottom of the European ranking could be considered as mid-level countries when 
compared  world-wide.  This  means  that  the  negative  effect  of  education  on 
corruption  perception  should  turn  towards  zero.  In  the  worst  effected  European 
countries, it might even turn positive with higher educated people perceiving more 
corruption than the average. 
Since this part of the debate around corruption perceptions seems fruitful, this 
analysis will concentrate mainly on socio-economic status, education, and their link 
to perceived corruption. The dataset unfortunately does not include a question on 
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income. Therefore, a crucial component of social status is missing in the analysis. 
But the data include a question about the respondent’s occupation. So, it is possible 
to  construct  a  social  class  variable  following  the  class  schema  from  Erikson, 
Goldthorpe,  and  Portocarero  (EGP)  (cf.  Erikson/Goldthorpe  1993).  The 
questionnaire furthermore includes a subjective indicator of social status. This is a 
question about the self-assessment of one’s social standing measured on a 10-point 
scale. Finally, the education variable can also be interpreted as a proxy for the level 
of social status, although it should be mainly seen as an indicator in its own right.
All  hypotheses  regard  corruption  perception  when  controlled  for  corruption 
experience. It means that these are the effects remaining influential when corruption 
experience is considered as equal among the respondents. 
The first general hypothesis is 
H1 Social status determines corruption perceptions. 
It has to be tested whether social status, measured through the EGP class schema 
and  the  subjective  social  status  of  the  respondent,  plays  a  significant  role  in 
corruption perception. Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) and Bonvin (2008: 31) find that 
people  from a  higher  income strata  perceive  more  corruption. Smith  (2008:  10) 
reports for his international dataset that “a significant negative relationship exists 
between social status and corruption perceptions, with higher social status leading to 
less widespread perceptions of corruption”. An income variable does not exist in the 
dataset  of  this  study.  Therefore,  the  social  status  indicators  resemble  more  the 
approach of Smith (2008). This results in the hypothesis 
H2 Higher social status leads to less corruption perception.
The next hypothesis points into a similar direction.  Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) 
and Olken (2006: 22)  find that  on the individual level better educated respondents 
reported more corruption. But the social status variable in Smith (2008), which also 
contains  education,  had  a  negative  correlation  with  corruption  perception.  As 
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discussed before, this influence can turn around when the general level of corruption 
perception in a country rises. Since European states are rather countries with a low 
level of corruption perception, the correlation should be in general negative when 
compared world-wide. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be formulated: 
H3 More education leads to less corruption perception.
As a next step in the analysis, the focus will shift on the changing influence of 
education, which depends on the general level of corruption perception in a country. 
Following  the  suggestions  from the  literature  on  social  status  (especially  Smith 
2008) analogically, these three options will be tested:
H4.1 Education has a negative correlation with corruption perception in countries 
with a low level of general corruption perception.
H4.2 Education has zero correlation with corruption perception in countries with 
a medium level of general corruption perception.
H4.3 Education has a positive correlation with corruption perception in countries 
with a high level of general corruption perception.
A hypothesis treated in several studies (Smith 2008, Rose/Mishler 2008) is the 
idea that the use of contacts and networks leads on average to more corruption. If 
one does  not  use contacts,  business  contacts,  family members,  friends,  for one’s 
forthcoming, one is less likely to encounter corruption since such situations will be 
limited to  the few contacts  that  are  absolutely necessary.  Those who work have 
naturally more contacts and, subsequently, the probability of encountering situations 
of potential corruption will rise. To test this, all respondents that are working will be 
compared to those that are either unemployed, at home, retired or studying.
H5 People who are working perceive more corruption.
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The next hypothesis treats the question, if the unemployed are generally more 
unsatisfied with the institutions of a state or society and if this attitude leads them to 
perceive more or less corruption. Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) find the employed to 
perceive more corruption, but  Čábelková/Hanousek (2004: 391) find the opposite. 
This contradicts the previous hypothesis. If it is true that people who work perceive 
more corruption, then they should see also more corruption than the group of the 
unemployed. The same is true vice versa. Therefore, only one of the two hypotheses 
can be true. The result will indicate whether corruption perception is the outcome of 
the real experience of corruption (more contacts would then lead to more corruption 
perception) or if it is the outcome of a feeling of dissatisfaction.
H6 People who are unemployed perceive more corruption.
Several other socio-economic factors, like age and gender, have been so far tested 
in the literature. Since they are usually available in standard questionnaires, they get 
always  tested,  despite  the  lack  of  any  theoretical  reasoning.  For  the  sake  of 
completeness they will be tested here as well. Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) claim for 
their survey that age has a non-linear effect on corruption perception with positive 
influence for young people that declines with increasing age becoming negative at 
the age of 50. Bonvin (2008) finds in the same dataset that younger respondents 
perceive less  corruption.  Smith (2008:  16)  finds  a  strong negative effect  of age. 
From these contradictory results the following hypothesis will be chosen: 
H7 A higher age leads to less corruption perception.
For gender there are contradictory findings in the literature as well. In Olken’s 
study  (2006:  22)  male  respondents  reported  more  corruption.  Smith  (2008:  17) 
found  female  respondents  reporting  more  corruption.  In  Čábelková/Hanousek 
(2004: 391) the results were inconclusive. Swamy et al. (2001) show female gender 
as  a  reducing  factor  of  corruption,  a  view  that  is  much  contested  by  others 
(cf. Lambsdorff 2005a: 26). Here it will be tested whether 
H8 Men perceive more corruption. 
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Living in a large city has a negative influence on corruption perception according 
to  Donchev/Ujhelyi  (2008:  21),  but  a  positive  according  to  Smith  (2008:  17). 
Čábelková/Hanousek (2004: 390) found that people in middle sized towns see less 
corruption than people from villages or large towns. The understanding of what is to 
be considered as a city differed between the studies.
H9 A bigger size of the community leads to less corruption perception.
The main assumption of any corruption measurement is the idea that it reflects 
the real level of corruption in society. The expert assessments constituting the basis 
for various corruption indices, population surveys, and finally the whole wave of 
ever  growing corruption  research  since  the  1990s  are  build  upon the  thesis  that 
corruption perceptions are an apt indicator for corruption in a given country. At least, 
it is considered to be the best measure available. Now that micro level studies with 
victimization data, i.e. corruption experience questions, are available, this very thesis 
is under criticism. There is not any longer an agreement among researchers whether 
actual corruption does have any real impact on corruption perception at all. Some 
find that there is not any impact (Donchev/Ujhelyi 2008), some find that it is less 
than those of other variables (Seligson 2006), others can detect an influence from 
corruption experience on corruption perception.  Rose/Mishler (2008: 3) conclude 
even  more  critically,  with  stating  that  experience  of  corruption  is  less  likely  to 
influence  perceptions  of  corruption,  than  perceptions  are  to  bias  the  recall  of 
corruption experiences. Using data from the GCB, Rose/Mishler (2008: 14) find a 
weak correlation between corruption perception and corruption experience on the 
individual level. Smith (2008) and Smith/Mateju (2009) expect and find a significant 
positive correlation between corruption experience and corruption perception. 
Since the whole concept of measuring corruption is based on the very idea that 
perception depicts an approximate level of real corruption, here, the hypothesis will 
be tested whether corruption experience does have in fact an influence on corruption 
perception:
H10 Corruption experience has a positive impact on corruption perception.
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The critical approach of this study would, however, do not make sense, if the 
author would not suspect an influential role of the above mentioned socio-economic 
factors and their strong influence on corruption perception. Therefore, it will also be 
analysed whether corruption experience is the most influential factor which has an 
impact  on  corruption  perception  or  whether  other  factors  are  more  influential. 
Donchev/Ujhelyi  (2008:  2) stated that  other  variables than corruption experience 
significantly bias away corruption perception from corruption experience.
National  level  factors influencing corruption are abundant  in  the literature.  In 
fact, most corruption studies in the past have been conducted using aggregated data. 
Since the seminal article from Mauro (1995), dozens of papers have been published 
on the consequences and causes of corruption on country level. The recent literature 
on  questions  of  corruption  measurement  has  also  made  use  of  country  level 
variables. Some of them are used in this study as well. There are only two variables 
having so far been directly linked to the problem of measuring corruption through 
perception. These are media prevalence and ethnic division. 
Olken (2006: 22, 3) found in his study that higher ethnic heterogeneity created a 
higher level of perceived corruption, but was associated with lower levels of missing 
expenditure, i.e. his objective measure for corruption. Therefore, a hypothesis for 
this study is the following: 
H11 Higher ethnic division leads to more corruption perception.
To test it, an updated version of the ethnolinguistic fracternalization index will be 
used, which includes all European countries. Generally speaking, the index counts 
the number of ethnic groups in a country. A detailed description can be found in 
chapter five.
Rose/Mishler  (2008:  26)  discuss the influential  role  of  the media.  Cross-level 
interaction effects between corruption perception and newspaper circulation show 
that the influence of different types of corruption on each other are mediated through 
newspaper consumption. They call this phenomenon “echo chamber effect of the 
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media”. This analysis includes their proxy for media effects, the average circulation 
of daily newspapers in a country, in order to test for similar effects. It has to be 
mentioned here, that the indicator can be put in question. The simple number of 
printed newspapers per country seems to be only a crude proxy for media effects. 
Nonetheless, the following hypothesis will be included in this study:
H12 Higher media prevalence leads to more corruption perception.
Many  other  country  level  variables  are  available  for  testing,  as  for  instance 
democracy or economic growth,  etc.  There has not been any specific  theoretical 
background  why  these  variables  should  influence  corruption  perception  holding 
corruption experience constant. That is the reason why they have not been included 
into this paper. GDP per capita, however, will be included as control variable for 
economic development. It is included in almost every cross-country study available 
and, therefore, it will serve as a point of reference in this one as well. As research 
about  corruption  perception  and corruption  experiences  has  developed and more 
theoretical insights have been gained, it  will  certainly become worthwhile in the 
future to look at more country level variables in upcoming studies. 
In the next chapter the operationalization of the hypotheses will be described and 
the data which were used to test them. 
5. Data and Operationalization
The chapter  starts  with  a  general  overview of  the  data.  All  variables  will  be 
described in detail, individual level as well as group level variables. In order to put 
corruption perception under stern examination, actual corruption experience will be 
included as control variable. An index of corruption perception will be constructed 
as dependent variable. Both, the index of corruption perception and the corruption 
experience question will be discussed more broadly and descriptive analyses will be 
presented for both.
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To test the hypotheses, microlevel data from the Eurobarometer (EB) series was 
used.  The EB is  a  social  survey series conducted by the European Commission, 
which asks Europeans about their  opinion and their  behaviour on various topics. 
This study used the EB 72.2 from 2009 (European Commission 2009a), a poll that 
was  conducted  in  all  27 European Union member  countries.6 This  survey asked 
respondents – besides various other topics – about their perceptions of corruption 
and their actual experiences with corruption. 
The  questions  on  corruption  in  the  EB 72.2  include  two  question  sets  on 
corruption  perception  and  a  question  on  corruption  experience,  as  well  as  three 
question sets on the fight and the prevention of corruption. The countries included in 
the  study are,  in  alphabetical  order,  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus,7 the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (with 
separate data for Eastern Germany), Great Britain (with separate data for Northern 
Ireland), Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 
In the analysis, East Germany and Northern Ireland will be treated as separate 
entities. There is theoretical justification for this approach, as well as a statistical 
reason. For East German it is well known that there has been, on the one hand, an 
economical adaption process, which has led to a different social  structure of the 
region, and, on the other hand, an ongoing differentiation in values and opinions. 
Looking at the phenomenon of corruption, the difference between the two parts of 
Germany has even prompted a study fully dedicated to the comparison of corruption 
in East and West Germany (Clemens 2000). The situation with Northern Ireland is 
not as clear-cut, but it is still worthwhile looking at the region separately. 
Statistically, it is favourable for the multilevel regression analysis to have around 
30 objects on the group level. When including East Germany and Northern Ireland 
as  separate  analytical  entities  the  analysis  contains  altogether  29  countries  and 
6 The data is publicly available through the website of the Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences at 
http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer (16.11.2010).
7 The northern Turkish community of Cyprus is not included.
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regions.  Then the  ideal  aim is  closer  than  in  many other  comparable  multilevel 
analysis. 
The EB data is representative for the population of all 27 countries, thus for the 
population  of  the  entire  European  Union  above  the  age  of  15.  The  samples 
constituting the EB 72.2 were drawn according to a multi-stage random (probability) 
design.  Sampling  points  were  drawn  for  the  respective  administrative  regions 
proportional to population size and type of region (metropolitan, urban, and rural). 
Then, random starting addresses were drawn from these regions and, subsequently, 
further addresses were selected by random route procedure. In each household, the 
respondent was randomly selected by using the closest birthday rule. The interviews 
were conducted face-to-face in the households in the appropriate national language. 
CAPI was used in those countries,  where this  technique was available.8 At least 
1 000 respondents were questioned in each country,  except for Ireland (976),  the 
Republic of Cyprus (505), Luxembourg (500), Malta (500), East Germany (515), 
and Northern Ireland (306). In total 26 663 respondents are within the sample. 
The  operationalization  of  the  concept  of  corruption  perception  follows  three 
questions on corruption included in the EB. The questions were computed into an 
index  of  corruption  perception.  Explanatory factor  analysis  was  used  to  analyse 
initially five questions on corruption perception. Out of them, three questions were 
chosen due to statistical and theoretical considerations. Subsequently, a confirmatory 
factor analysis was carried out to prove the consistency of the index across all 29 
countries and regions in the dataset.
In order to control for real corruption experience, a variable indicating whether 
the  respondent  has  actually  experienced  corruption  is  used.  The  question  in  the 
survey asks whether the respondent has been asked or expected to pay a bribe within 
the previous year. 
8 With population data from Eurostat or national statistical institutes the data was weighted for gender, age, 
region and size of locality using marginal and intercellular weighting procedures.
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The  EB  provides  a  number  of  background  variables  allowing  an  analysis  of 
various hypotheses. Most other studies do not contain enough background variables 
to make a similar analysis. In the GCB, for instance, gender, age, education, income, 
employment, and religion are included, but mostly in a strongly categorized manner: 
age has four categories (“Under 30”, “30-50”, “51-65”, and “65+”), education three 
categories  (“No  or  basic  Education”,  “Secondary  Education”,  and  “Post-
Secondary/College”),  income three categories (“Low/Med Low”,  “Med/Med Hi”, 
and  “High”),  and  employment  four  categories  (“working  full  or  part  time”, 
“unemployed”,  “not  working”,  and  “retired”).  In  the  EB,  age  and education  are 
measured  on  a  metric  scale.  Employment  is  measured  through  the  occupational 
status of the respondent. This variable leaves various different analyses open to the 
researcher. 
5.1 Independent Variables
The variables which were used to test the hypotheses are presented in detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
5.1.2 Individual Level
The following individual  level  variables  were  produced from the  EB dataset: 
gender,  age,  education,  social  class,  whether  the  respondent  works,  employment 
status, subjective social status, type of community (urban/rural), the difficulty to pay 
the monthly bills, and corruption experience. Besides explaining how the variables 
were constructed or recoded, a short overview about their distributions will be given 
when necessary.
Gender
Throughout the whole sample, the respondents are 54,7 % female and 45,3 % 
male. In some countries the distribution is rather skew, for instance in Malta (63,8 % 
female, 36,2 % male) and Hungary (61,2 % female, 38,8 % male). Obviously, the 
face-to-face method bears problems related to sampling. In Eastern Europe, women 
are apparently much easier to be reached than men. The probable reason is that they 
are more likely to be reached at home at the time the interviews were conducted. In 
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Sweden, on the other hand, the distribution is the reverse, with 45,2 % female and 
54,8 % male.
Age
Respondents were surveyed beginning at the age of 15. The distribution of age 
varies  from  country  to  country.  However,  there  are  not  any  noteworthy 
characteristics that would be relevant to this analysis.
Education
The EB does not measure the number of education years, or the last completed 
level of education, but the age of the respondent when completing education. Since 
it does not ask for education certificates, there is not any exact information about the 
real education level. On the one hand, it can be difficult for cross-country studies – 
like  this  one  –  comparing  the  level  of  education  when  comparing  education 
certificates  since  they are  often  very different,  but,  on the other  hand,  there  are 
elaborated classification schemes of  education levels  in order  to  make education 
across  Europe  more  comparable.  Since  the  age  of  children,  when  they  start 
schooling, differs across European countries, certain problems with comparability 
remain with this method, too.
However, in most European countries finishing education with 15 years means to 
have basic education since compulsory education ends at  this  age.  In earlier  EB 
studies the coding ended with the category “22 years or older“ indicating tertiary 
education. For various reasons it is thinkable, however, that people faced delays and 
finish secondary schooling only at this age. Therefore with the current data, one can 
only guess the exact level of education the respondent actually has.
Values between zero and four are treated as missing (156 cases) since usually 
education does not end at this age – when it has not even begun for most of the 
people. It is not clear whether some coding errors happened here. Even if the coding 
was right, misunderstandings or cases of misinformation could have happened.
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Social Status
The respondent’s social standing was measured with  a modified version of the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero  class  schema  (Erikson/Goldthorpe  1993:  38), 
which is the classical way of operationalization of social class or status in empirical 
social science. The original version, which is most widely used, consists of a seven 
class  scheme.  Knutsen  (2006:  19)  constructed  an  adapted  version  using  the 
occupational status (table one) from the EB. Through the occupational status of the 
respondent, six social classes are differentiated (table two): Employers, higher-level 
nonmanual employees, medium-level nonmanual employees, lower-level nonmanual 
employees, employers in the primary industries, and workers. The concept basically 
follows  the  differentiation  between  those  who are  working  in  a  service  relation 
between  employer  and employee  and  those  who have  a  labour  contract  and  do 
manual work. People, who are not working (those responsible for the household, 
students, the unemployed, and the retired) are kept within the analysis at this stage. 
The variable is constructed as dummy variable.
Table 1 Occupation categories in the Eurobarometer
1 Farmers
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
No. Occupation
Self-employed
Fishermen
Professionals (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)
Owners of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company
Employed
Employed professionals (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)
General management, directors or top management
(management director, director general, other director)
Middle Management, other management 
(department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)
Employed position (working mainly at a desk)
Employed position, not at desk but traveling (salesman, driver, etc.)
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job 
(hospital restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)
Supervisors
Skilled manual workers
Other (unskilled) manual workers, servants
Eurobarometer (European Commission 2009a)
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The distribution of the social classes is as following: Those, who do not work 
account for more than half (51,8 %) of the European population. The biggest group 
of  those  following  an  occupation  are  the  lower-level  nonmanual  employees 
(18,2 %),  followed  by  workers  (13,2  %),  medium-level  nonmanual  employees 
(6,2 %),  employers  (5,7  %),  higher-level  nonmanual  employees  (3,5  %),  and 
employers in the primary industries (1,3 %). With more than 50 %, a large portion of 
the sample are missing values. From here on, those who are not working are also 
treated as missing values.
Table 2 Construction of the social class variable
3, 4, 5
6, 7
8
9, 10, 11
1, 2
12, 13, 14
Social Class Number of occupation (Table x)
Employers
Higher-level nonmanual employees (H nm.)
Medium-level nonmanual employees (M nm.)
Lower-level nonmanual employees (L nm.)
Self-employed in the primary sector (Self. Prim)
Workers/working class (Work.)
Eurobarometer (European Commission 2009a); Knutsen (2006: 19)
The following two variables “working” and “unemployment” derived from the 
occupation variable as well. 
Working – Not Working
This variable has two categories: those, who are in gainful employment, are put 
into the category “working”, those, who are not in gainful employment, i.e. those in 
the categories “responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or 
without  any  current  occupation,  not  working”,  “students”,  “unemployed  or 
temporarily not working”, and “retired or unable to work through illness”, are put 
into the group “not working”. 
Europe-wide 51,8 % are working and 48,2 % are not working. The highest share 
of people, who are not working has Malta with 65,6 %, followed by Hungary with 
63,1 %. On the other side of the scale, there are Austria with only 35,8 % of the 
people not working and Slovakia with 40,8 %.
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Employed – Unemployed
At this point, it has to be emphasized again that the data does not reflect official  
data, but the answers of the respondents. Therefore, if someone states he or she is 
unemployed when asked for the current occupation,  the person is  categorized as 
unemployed regardless of his or her official status. 
According to this sample, Europe-wide 7,0 % are unemployed. The highest share 
is in Latvia with 13,8 %, followed by Spain with 13,2 %. On the other side of the 
scale, there are Cyprus with 2,8 % and Austria with 2,0 %. 
Subjective Social Status: Self-placement in Society
The  latest  waves  of  the  EB  include  a  question  about  the  respondent’s  self-
assessment of his or her social standing. The respondents had to put themselves on a 
10-point scale answering the question: “On the following scale step ʻ1ʼ corresponds 
to  ʻthe  lowest  level  in  societyʼ,  step  ʻ10ʼ  corresponds  to  ʻthe  highest  level  in 
societyʼ. Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself?” This question 
is included in the analysis in order to detect biases stemming from self-perceived 
social status. 
Overall in Europe, 50 % regard themselves as belonging to the lower 50 % of 
society.  In Bulgaria 80,9 % regard themselves to be on the levels 1 to 5 and in 
Hungary 75,8 %. On the other side of the scale, there are the Netherlands where only 
17,1 % put themselves between 1 to 5 and 40 % on level 7.
Difficulty to Pay Bills
This question gives another general indication of the respondent’s social standing. 
On the one hand, problems with paying bills are mainly an issue for lower income 
groups. On the other hand, it is also possible that people with a high income may 
face difficulties to pay their bills from time to time. The question runs: “During the 
last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of 
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the month…?” with the possible answers “most of the time”, “from time to time”, 
and “almost never/never”.9
10,1 % answered that they had difficulties to pay their bills most of the time, 
28,4 % from time to time, and 59,2 % almost never or never. The highest share of 
those, who faced such problems most of the time had Bulgaria with 33,5 % and 
Malta with 21,0 %. The highest share of those, who (almost) never face this problem 
had Sweden with 91,7 % and Denmark with 89,4 %. Since the question, whether one 
can  pay his  bills,  is  also  a  rough  indicator  for  one’s  social  standing,  it  will  be 
included in the analysis. 
Type of Community: Urban – Rural
Two variables about the size of the respondent’s community are available in the 
dataset.  One  codes  communities  after  the  country’s  municipal  areas.  It  varies 
strongly between the countries since sizes between municipal areas differ largely 
within and between countries. The other question asks about the type of community 
the respondent lives in: a rural area or village, a small or middle sized town, or a 
large town. The question is subjective and open to interpretation by the respondent, 
but eventually depicts the relative size within a country in a better way. Furthermore, 
it  is  not  dependent  from  administrative  classifications  that  could,  for  instance, 
qualify rather rural, suburban areas as cities despite having rural characteristics and 
vice versa. 
Europe-wide 35,6 % report to live in rural areas or in a village, 35,7 % live in a 
small or middle sized town, and 28,6 % live in a large town. Malta has the biggest  
share of people living in rural areas or a village with 56,6 %, followed by Austria 
with 50,2 %. Italy is the country where the middle category has the biggest share, 
with 59,0 % of the Italians saying that they live in a small or middle sized town, 
followed by Germany West with 54,2 %. Interestingly, Greece is the country with 
the  biggest  share  of  people  stating  that  they live  in  a  large  town with  55,9  %, 
9 It was probably added to the EB 72.2 version as response to the inexistent income variable in previous 
studies. Information on why certain variables are added and certain discarded is scarce. The EB information 
bureau, unfortunately, is not very informative either in this point.
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followed by Bulgaria with 48,6 %. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
data does not only reflect the real distribution of the population within a country, but 
much more the sampling procedure of the data, which is often concentrated to urban 
areas. This was probably the case in Greece and Bulgaria.
Corruption Experience
In  order  to  test  the  value  of  measuring  corruption  perception,  the  index  is 
controlled  with  an  objective  measure  of  corruption:  corruption  experience  or 
corruption victimization.10 In contrast to expert opinion studies or popular corruption 
rankings, but in line with other population surveys like the ICVS, the GCB, or the 
ISSP, the EB contains a question about actual corruption experience. The question 
asks  whether  the respondent  has  experienced an  incidence  of  bribery.  It  runs  as 
follows:  “Over  the  last  12  months,  has  anyone  in  (our  country)  asked  you,  or 
expected you, to pay a bribe for his or her services?” Then the respondent is once 
again asked for twelve different professional groups whether they have asked him to 
pay a bribe or not. These are the police service, the judicial service, the customs 
service,  politicians  at  local,  regional  or  national  level,  officials  awarding  public 
tenders, officials issuing building or business permits, people working in the public 
health or education sector, and inspectors (health, construction, food quality, sanitary 
control, and licensing). The respondent answers for each group with “yes” or “no”.
Evidently, the question asks only whether the respondent has been  asked for a 
bribe. Due to the illegality of corruption no one would answer whether he or her 
offered someone a bribe. Naturally in corruption relations, this can be the case as 
well. It would be naïve to think that the initiative for bribery always comes from 
government officials (cf. Galtung 2006: 104). Corruption can also be and often is a 
complicit act where none of the actors reveal the common secret. This shows that the 
question cannot capture the whole level of corruption. We do not know how many 
did follow the demand for a bribe and how many did not. It is also not known how 
10 Depending on the source either the term “corruption experience” or “corruption victimization” is used. The 
word “victimization” is mostly used in the area of criminology, where victimization studies are carried out 
for various types of crimes. 
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many  people  have  offered  to  pay  a  bribe  without  being  asked  and  how  many 
officials have finally acceded to the offer or refused it.
Figure 1 Percent of population in EU-27 that reports an 
experience of corruption in 2009
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Question: “Over the last 12 months, has anyone in (respondent’s country) asked you, or 
expected you, to pay a bribe for his or her services?”
N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
Also,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  indicator  does  not  directly  reflect  actual 
behaviour,  but  in  fact  self-reported  behaviour.  Whether  the  respondent  reported 
correctly or whether the respondent completely remembered his or her behaviour, 
are problems that have been treated in classical studies about the interview. In spite 
of  that,  behaviour  should  be  always  favoured  when  possible.  Or  as  Labaw 
(1982: 103) put it: “Behavior tells a complete story. Respondent testimony provides 
an incomplete story.” 
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The Europe-wide level of corruption is 9,4 % (figure 1). The measurement was 
the actual experience of corruption 12 months prior to the questioning (weighted for 
country size). It means that approximately every tenth European has been asked to 
pay a bribe or has actually paid a bribe within the year 2009.11 
Figure 2 Percent of population per country that reports an 
experience of corruption in 200912
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Question: “Over the last 12 months, has anyone in (respondent’s country) asked you, or expected you, to pay a 
bribe for his or her services?”
N = 26663. For EU-27 mean countries weighted for size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
When looking at specific countries (figure 2), Lithuania shows the highest rate of 
corruption with 26,6 % of the citizens having experienced corruption, followed by 
Romania with 25,3 % and Slovakia with 21,9 %. The lowest rate of corruption has 
11 Fieldwork has been carried out in September and October 2009.
12 The values in figure 2 differ slightly from the distribution charts in the Special Eurobarometer 325 Report on  
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a). There, weighting was used for country size. In this 
figure, weighting is only used for the European score.
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Northern  Ireland  with  0,7  %.13 Besides  Northern  Ireland,  the  lowest  rate  of 
corruption has Denmark with 1,4 %, followed by Sweden with 2,6 %, and Great 
Britain with 2,7 %. Out of the top ten countries with the highest level of corruption, 
eight are Eastern European countries, with the exceptions of Italy at rank four and 
Austria at rank ten. All ten countries with the lowest level of corruption are Western 
European countries. 
Table 3 Total cases of bribery attempts per professional group
Police 566
287
277
226
207
224
236
274
176
950
162
224
459
4.268
Group Frequency
Customs
Judicial Services
Politicians national
Politicians regional
Politicians local
Official awarding public tenders
Official issuing building permits
Official issuing business permits
Public health sector
Public education sector
Inspector 
(health, construction, food quality,
sanitary control, licensing)
Someone Else
Total cases
“Over the last 12 months, has anyone in (our country) 
asked you, or expected you, to pay a bribe for his or her
services?” Card with rotated items, multiple answers possible. 
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a)
For the question of bribery in different professional groups, a detailed descriptive 
analysis was performed (table three). In this distribution, members from the public 
health sector are reported the most to have asked for a bribe with 950 mentions 
(multiple answers were allowed). They are followed by the police with 566 reported 
cases. The third biggest group is the one without any specific specification. Then 
comes a large middle group with approximately 300 to 200 reported cases including 
customs,  judicial  services,  officials  issuing  building  permits  or  awarding  public 
13 In fact, only two out of 304 people in the sample report to have experienced corruption.
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tenders,  politicians,  and  inspectors.  The  least  offers  have  been  reported  from 
officials issuing business permits and people from the public education sector. 
Since there is only such a small number of cases in total, further investigation 
differentiates only between those who have been offered a bribe by at least one of 
the previous professional groups and between those who have not been offered a 
bribe at all. Thus, the variable divides between those who had an actual experience 
with corruption 12 months before the questioning and between those who did not 
have any such experience at all. 
It  should not  be  very hard to  remember  whether  one  has  had any corruption 
experience or not. Only 514 respondents chose to answer with “Don’t Know”. This 
can be interpreted as a sign that there are not any major fears to mention an attempt 
or incidence of corruption. If all “Don’t Knows” would be corruption incidences 
which have not been reported out of mistrust against the study, the corruption rate 
among the EU-27 would gain 1,8 % and rise up to 11,2 %. However, it could also be 
true  that  some  answer  straight  away  that  they  did  not  experience  corruption, 
although they actually did in order not to get into troubles. 
There are also other reasons why reporting actual corruption experience can be 
still  problematic.  First  of  all,  memories  are  imperfect  and  a  selection  of  it  is 
unconsciously made according to the personal situation of the respondents, as well 
as  national  context  (Nisbet/Wilson,  1977).  Furthermore,  Rose/Mishler  (2008:  9) 
remind us that, on the one hand, respondents may forget events of corruption where 
there is a lot of corruption, hence underestimating the situation, but, on the other 
hand, might report instances that are more than 12 months ago and overestimate the 
occurrence of corruption.
5.1.3 Country Level
Besides individual determinants, there are also parameters on the aggregate level 
which  potentially  influence  corruption  perception,  as  discussed  in  chapter  four 
where the hypotheses were introduced. The multilevel regression model allows not 
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only to analyse the data with regard to the group, i.e. national context, but also to 
include  variables  at  the  country level.  Here,  country variables  are  introduced  to 
control for influences on the country level, as well as to test hypotheses from the 
literature  concerning  the  influences  of  aggregated  data.  Only  those  factors  are 
included in the analysis which have a theoretical background about their influence 
on both corruption perception and corruption experience. Therefore, some country 
level variables, which are common to conventional corruption analyses, are put aside 
here. GDP per capita is included as control variable. Detailed coding is appended as 
an annex to this paper.
Newspapers
The prevalence of the media is measured through the number of daily newspapers 
per 1 000 people. Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a 
week and calculated as average circulation or copies printed per 1 000 people. The 
data  comes  from  the  Institute  for  Statistics  at  the  United  Nations  Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and depicts the year 2004.14 Other 
ways of measuring media prevalence are possible,  e.g.  the number of titles in a 
country. 
The procedure of this study has been used before in the literature (Rose/Mishler 
2008) and can therefore be compared with existing results. However, the indicator is 
rather crude and becomes probably more and more outdated since other types of 
media like the internet gain importance. 
Ethnic Plurality
Ethnic  plurality  or  ethnic  division  is  measured  through  ethnolinguistic 
fracternalization. It has been included in several classical corruption studies (e.g. 
Mauro 1995, Treisman 2000).  The original ethnolinguistic fracternalization index 
(ELF) uses data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk/Apenchenko 1964), which were 
compiled in Taylor and Hudson (1972: 271-274). Here, a version was used which 
has been updated and enlarged (Roeder 2001).15 For countries of recent formation, 
14 Data available under http://stats.uis.unesco.org (16.11.2010).
15 Index data available under http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm (16.11.2010).
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estimations were calculated for today’s respective territory with national census data 
from the year 1985.16 The index measures the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.
GDP Per Capita
As another country level factor, the standard control variable GDP per capita is 
included.17 There  is  not  any certain  theoretical  reasoning  behind the  decision  to 
include it in this study, but to include it as a simple control variable. The impact of  
GDP on corruption has been studied extensively without any clear-cut results (see 
Lambsdorff 2005a: 7). It is included in many other studies as control factor. Data are 
in current U.S. Dollars and comes from the World Bank national accounts data and 
OECD National Accounts data files from 2008.18
5.2 The Dependent Variable: Corruption Perception
In the analysis, the dependent variable is corruption perception. Several questions 
on corruption perception are included in the questionnaire of the EB. The aim of the 
dependent variable is to reflect the general level of corruption perception in a given 
country. Therefore, a combination of several questions constructing an index seems 
the best procedure. 
In this study, five questions concern corruption perception: 1) “Corruption is a 
major problem in (our country)”, 2) “There is corruption in local institutions in (our 
country)”,  3)  “There  is  corruption  in  regional  institutions  in  (our  country)”,  4) 
“There is corruption in national institutions in (our country)”. All of them have four 
choices as answer: “Totally agree”, “Tend to agree”, “Tend to disagree”, “Totally 
disagree”.19 The next question asks for corruption in specific groups: 5) “In (our 
country),  do  you  think  that  the  giving  and  taking  of  bribes,  and  the  abuse  of 
16 Information by Roeder through personal correspondence. 
17 GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. GDP per capita is the 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population.
18 Data available under http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (16.11.2010).
19 The wording of the English version of the bilingual questionnaire is used here.
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positions of power for personal gain, are widespread among any of the following?”. 
The options for “yes”/”no” answers are the twelve following groups: police service, 
judicial  service,  customs  service,  politicians  at  local,  regional  or  national  level, 
officials awarding public tenders, buildings or business permits, people working in 
the  public  health  or  education  sector  and  inspectors  (health,  construction,  food 
quality, sanitary control, and licensing).
 78,1 % of the European population strongly agree or agree that corruption is a 
major problem in their country. Europe-wide, 81,1 % agree that corruption exists in 
institutions on local level, 80,9 % agree that it exists in institutions on regional level,  
and 82,9 % agree that it  exists in institutions on national level.  In the following 
figures, detailed distributions are presented of corruption perception answers for the 
whole sample.
Figure 3 European average of the answers to the question 
“Corruption is a major problem in respondent’s country”
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N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
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Figure 4 European average of the answers to the question 
“There is corruption in local institutions in respondent’s country”
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N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
Figure 5 European average of the answers to the question 
“There is corruption in regional institutions in respondent’s country”
0 1 2 3 DK
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
45,0
50,0
2,2
11,0
44,4
36,5
5,9
Pe
rc
en
t o
f p
op
ul
at
io
n
N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
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Figure 6 European average of the answers to the question 
“There is corruption in national institutions in respondent’s country”
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N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
 The construction of an index of corruption perception from these questions is the 
next step in the analysis. This index reflects the level of corruption perception for 
each  country.  To  build  the  index,  those  questions  have  to  be  identified  which 
correlate best with the concept of “corruption perception”. In order to achieve this, a 
factor analysis has to be performed. 
5.2.1 Factor Analysis
The following factor  analysis  includes  the five questions,  which already have 
been described: four questions on general corruption perception and one question 
about corruption in various professional groups. The variables of the four general 
questions  are  called  corrproblem,  corrlocal,  corrregional,  and  corrnational. The 
variable  for  the  question  about  corruption  in  professional  groups  is  called 
corrgroups. 
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In order to integrate the question corrgroups into the factor analysis, every “yes” 
answer for each of the 12 professional groups was counted resulting in an additive 
index from 0 to 13. Someone, who did not see any of the 12 groups as corrupt had a 
value of 0 and someone, who saw all of the 12 groups as corrupt and additionally 
mentioned that he or she also saw “other” groups as corrupt received the maximum 
value of 13. 
Then, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed with the five items 
corrproblem, corrlocal, corrregional, corrnational, and corrgroups. The EFA shows 
that all five corruption perception questions load on a single factor.20 There is not 
any  second  factor,  which  is  not  surprising,  since  the  questions  are  very  close 
thematically. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for the whole 
factor analysis is 0,861 indicating a “meritorious” result (Kaiser/Rice 1974: 111 in 
Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber 2008: 336).21
The  Bartlett-test  of  sphericity  is  significant  at  the  0,001-level  (chi-square  
88 283,48) showing the sample stems from a population where the variables are 
correlated as well. The first (and only) factor (Eigenvalue 3,592) explains 71,84 % 
of the variance of the items. Factor loadings range from 0,490 to 0,932 (see table 4). 
The  questions  one  to  four  in  the  factor  analysis  (corrproblem,  corrlocal, 
corrregional, corrnational) have the best loadings on the common factor “corruption 
perception”. Question number five has the weakest loadings to the common factor. 
Assumably,  the  respondents  lack  the  knowledge  about  corruption  in  specific 
fields  in  order  to  answer  the  fifth  question  on  corruption  perception  in  various 
professional  groups.  In  the  structure  of  the  answers,  the  resulting  inconsistency 
could  be  the  reason for  the  weak loadings.  Therefore,  it  will  be  excluded from 
further analysis and will not be used in the index for corruption perception. 
20 Principal axis factoring was performed. No factor rotation was computed since only one factor was extracted.
21 A value above 0,8 is desirable in order to continue with a factor analysis (Kaiser 1970: 405 in Backhaus, 
Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber 2008: 336). 
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Table 4 Factor loadings on the factor “corruption perception”
Factor Matrix
Variable Factor
corrproblem 0,793
corrlocal 0,901
corrregional 0,932
corrnational 0,880
corrgroups 0,490
Extraction Method:
Principal Axis Factoring.
5 iterations required.
For the remaining four questions, the loading of the item corrproblem is weaker 
than the loadings of the three questions about the existence of corruption on local, 
regional  or  national  level.  The  question  behind  item  corrproblem asks  whether 
corruption is a “major problem” in the country. The wording “major problem” has a 
rather subjective notion. The respondent might try to estimate the dimension of the 
problem of  corruption  in  reference  to  other  pressing  issues  in  his  or  her  life  or 
simply other issues in the country.  These different interpretations of the question 
could lead to different dimensions, which get included in the answers. Also, it can be 
difficult  to estimate the exact scale of what is  to be considered as “major”.  The 
dimensions of the interpretations of the word “major” must lead to differences in the 
interpretation. Finally, it has to be added that the wording of the question is almost 
formulated  like  a  suggestive  question.  With  the  suggestion  that  corruption  is  a 
“problem” at all, the respondent already gets half the answer. Every introduction to 
empirical social research emphasizes that suggestive questions are to be avoided. 
The other three questions have a comparatively analytical notion. They simply try 
to estimate the level of corruption. The question, whether corruption is a “problem”, 
has  a  certain  subjective  undertone,  which  might  produce  differing  results  that 
eventually lead to the weaker loading. Therefore, it will not enter the index as well.  
The  items  corrlocal,  corrregional,  and  corrnational all  act  as  a  more  direct 
assessment of the corruption situation in one’s country compared to the questions 
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before.  Furthermore,  they  are  all  very  close  in  their  loadings  and  are  therefore 
chosen for constructing an index of corruption perception.
Next, the comparability of the factor loadings across all countries will be tested. 
To compare the index of corruption perception between the countries and to use it 
consistently as dependent variable, an equal measurement should be guaranteed. A 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) tests the consistency of the three items and the 
comparability of the factor loadings. The question, which level of measurement can 
be assumed will be answered as well.
The CFA starts with a measurement weights model comparring the loadings of 
the  items  corrlocal,  corrregional,  and  corrnational on  the  factor  “corruption 
perception” for all 29 countries and regions. As the measure of fit, the measurement 
model  produces  a  CMIN22 of  528,4  at  56  degrees  of  freedom  resulting  in  a 
CMIN/DF-ratio  of  9,44  (p-value:  0,000).  This  ratio  is  usually  not  satisfactory 
(Arbuckle 2008: 587), but the chi-square and thus, the CMIN/DF-ratio are highly 
vulnerable to sample size. Their respective values can shoot up quickly, which seems 
to be the case with a population of 26 663. The values of other typical measures of 
fit  as the comparative fit  index (CFI) (0,990) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 
(0,984) indicate a very good fit (Arbuckle 2008: 597). The less rigorous root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) also shows a very close model fit with a 
value of 0,020 (Pclose=123) (Arbuckle 2008: 590). 
The results of the test for scalar equivalence are weaker with model fits of CMIN 
1 167,8 at 112 degrees of freedom. This causes an even higher CMIN/DF-ratio of 
10,43 (p-value: 0,000), although the CFI (0,977) and the TLI (0,983) still indicate a 
very good fit. Also, the RMSEA of 0,021 (Pclose=1) still indicates a close model fit. 
The CFA shows that the measurements can be compared and that the equivalence 
of measurement is on a metric level. Hence, metric invariance for all 29 countries 
and regions can be assumed. It means that the measurement units of the factor scores 
22 Minimum discrepancy of C.
23 Pclose is a “p value” for testing the null hypothesis that the population RMSEA is not greater than 0,05.
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can be compared across countries. An increase by one unit in the latent variable has 
the same meaning in all investigated countries. In other words, all three questions on 
corruption  perception  touch  the  same  topic  and  measure  the  same  phenomenon 
throughout  the  countries.  Due  to  the  lack  of  scalar  equivalence,  it  is,  however, 
statistically problematic to compare the means of the index of corruption perception 
across nations. According to this result, test measurement characteristics appear to 
vary between countries. 
Scalar  equivalence  is  a  rather  rigorous  pre-condition  and  the  result  does  not 
restrict this study to carry on with using the index of corruption perception. The 
results only indicate that one has to be very cautious when comparing an average 
corruption perception level across nations. That does not come as a surprise since 
the  27  EU-countries  have  quite  heterogeneous  characteristics.  In  the  field  of 
corruption, differences between countries become even more apparent since there 
are sometimes huge economic, political and cultural differences in what to perceive 
as corruption. This test result signifies that already on a measurement level, far from 
interpretations, corruption perceptions are not comparable easily. It should be noted 
that  there  are  no  reasons  why this  finding should  not  apply to  other  corruption 
perception measurements as well.
To further test the index, it was checked for scale reliability. The scale turns out to 
be highly reliable with a Cronbachʼs alpha value of 0,933 across countries ranging 
from 0,837 in Greece to 0,947 in Denmark, as shown in table 5. Once again, the 
result  underlines the fact  that  these items are also very close to  each other  in a 
theoretical way. 
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Table 5 Reliability test of the items of the index of corruption perception
Country Country
Belgium 0,909 Great Britain 0,925
Denmark 0,947 Northern Ireland 0,934
Germany West 0,926 Cyprus (Rep.) 0,935
Germany East 0,891 Czech Rep. 0,862
Greece 0,837 Estonia 0,855
Spain 0,905 Hungary 0,867
Finland 0,906 Latvia 0,859
France 0,896 Lithuania 0,924
Ireland 0,927 Malta 0,909
Italy 0,904 Poland 0,910
Luxembourg 0,914 Slovakia 0,922
Netherlands 0,942 Slovenia 0,908
Austria 0,906 Bulgaria 0,894
Portugal 0,936 Romania 0,909
Sweden 0,929 EU-27 0,933
Cronbach's 
Alpha
Cronbach's 
Alpha
5.2.2 Index of Corruption Perception
Factor analysis, as well as, the reliability check gave strong reasons to assume 
that these three questions measure a common factor and therefore can be computed 
into an index. The three questions form an additive index with a scale from zero to 
nine.  Every  question  has  a  range  from  zero  to  three,  with  zero  meaning  total 
disagreement and three total agreement. An index value of zero indicates that the 
respondent  totally disagrees  with  all  three  statements  (corruption  exists  in  local, 
regional, and national institutions) and nine means that the respondent totally agrees 
with all three statements. The respondent does not perceive any corruption at  all 
when his answers result in a value of zero and perceives rampant corruption when 
his questions result in a value of nine. 
Looking at the results of the descriptive analysis of this index, the average value 
for Europe is 6,7 points (figure 7) on the 9-point-scale with a standard deviation of 
2,1 points. 1,2 % of the European population answer all questions negative. Only 
one in a hundred does not see corruption as a problem at all or thinks that it does not 
exist on any of the administrative levels in his or her country. 31,9 % answer all 
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questions with total agreement. For them, corruption is a major problem in their 
country  and  they  totally  agree  that  it  exists  in  local,  regional,  and  national 
institutions in their country. 55,2 % get a cumulative score of at least 6 points, which 
means they have answered at least 2 out of 3 questions agreeing that corruption is a 
problem or exists in their country. Those, who had two or more refusals, were not 
included in the calculation. It shows that only very few, approximately 5 % of the 
Europeans, do not feel able to say anything at all about the level of corruption. 
Figure 7 Index of corruption perception in EU-27 in 2009
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Index score of three questions: “There is corruption in local/regional/national institutions in respondent’s 
country”. Four values for answers: Totally agree (3), Tend to agree (2), Tend to disagree (1), Totally disagree (0). 
N = 26663. Weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
In order to compare the countries among each other, the means of the index were 
calculated  for  each  country.24 Figure  eight  shows  the  ranking  of  the  countries 
24 It should be kept in mind that the results of the CFA showed that the means should be compared with some 
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according to each country’s mean.25 Greece has the highest mean with 8,1 points, 
closely followed by Bulgaria with 7,9 points, and Hungary with 7,8 points. On the 
other end of the ranking, there are Denmark with 3,3 points, Sweden with 4,9 points, 
and the Netherlands with 5,0 points. The European mean is 6,7 points. Out of the top 
ten  countries  with  the  highest  corruption  perception,  six  are  eastern  European 
countries  and three  countries  from Southern  Europe.  The ten  countries  with  the 
lowest corruption perception are all Western European countries. Interestingly, the 
standard  deviation  rises  with  a  downward position  in  the  ranking.  The differing 
variability  points  towards  the  fact  that  there  are  country  differences  and  that 
influences are not only on the individual level. This is especially considered in the 
choice for a multilevel regression model. 
Figure 8 Means of the index of corruption perception in EU-27 in 2009
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Index  score  of  three  questions:  “There  is  corruption  in  local/regional/national  institutions  in  respondent’s  
country”. Four values for answers: Totally agree (3), Tend to agree (2), Tend to disagree (1), Totally disagree (0). 
N = 26663. For the EU-27 mean countries weighted for country size (W22).
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
In order to take a look at the similarity of corruption perception and corruption 
experience,  the  two different  lists  were  put  next  to  each  other.  The comparison 
precaution.
25 Table with standard deviations in appendix (table II). 
65
between  the  ranking  of  corruption  experience  with  the  ranking  of  corruption 
perception  (table  six)  shows  some  notable  differences.  The  differences  can  be 
categorized  in  two  groups.  There  are  those  countries  having  a  position  in  the 
corruption perception ranking which is higher than their position in the corruption 
experience ranking. Then, there are those countries, whose position in the corruption 
experience ranking is higher than in the corruption perception ranking. In terms of 
corruption perception, some countries are overrated and some are underrated. 
The group of the overrated countries is led by Greece, the leader of the corruption 
perception ranking. Being number one concerning corruption perception, it is only 
on  seventh  position  in  the  corruption  experience  ranking.  The  case  of  Bulgaria 
shows the same difference being at the second position in the corruption perception 
ranking and at the eighth position in the corruption experience ranking. Hungary 
(number three) is on number six regarding the experience. Cyprus, at position 4 in 
the  corruption  perception  ranking,  is  equally  overrated  in  terms  of  the  actual 
corruption  perception  level,  holding  position  17  in  the  corruption  experience 
ranking. Slovenia, at rank 8, is only number 16 in the corruption experience ranking, 
Portugal  drops  from 9 to  14,  Ireland from 10 to  23,  Malta  from 12 to  19,  and 
Northern Ireland from 14 to 30.
In  contrast,  some  countries  have  a  lower  rank  in  the  corruption  perception 
ranking compared to the corruption experience ranking. Lithuania holds number six 
in the perception ranking, but number one when regarding experience.  Romania, 
fifth  regarding perception,  is  second in terms of experience.  Slovakia is  only on 
place number 15 in the corruption perception ranking, but holds position number 3 
in  the  corruption  experience  ranking,  similar  to  Italy having positions  16 and 4 
respectively. Poland raises from 19 to 11, Austria from 25 to 10, and Luxembourg 
from 27 to 20.
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Table 6 Ranking of EU-27 in corruption perception and corruption experience
Rank
1 8,1 26,6
2 7,9 25,3
3 7,8 21,9
4 7,7 17,6
5 7,6 17,4
6 7,6 16,7
7 7,5 16,4
8 7,5 16,2
9 Portugal 7,4 15,4
10 7,3 14,1
11 7,2 13,2
12 Malta 7,2 10,0
13 7,2 EU-27 9,4
14 7,2 Portugal 8,1
15 7,0 6,2
16 7,0 5,7
17 6,9 5,5
18 EU-27 6,7 5,3
19 6,6 Malta 5,0
20 6,6 5,0
21 6,5 4,1
22 6,5 3,8
23 6,4 3,1
24 6,3 3,0
25 5,4 2,7
26 5,3 2,7
27 5,1 2,7
28 5,0 2,6
29 4,9 1,4
30 3,3 ,7
Corruption Perception Corruption Experience
Country Index mean Country % of pop.
Greece Lithuania
Bulgaria Romania
Hungary Slovakia
Cyprus (Rep.) Italy
Romania Latvia
Lithuania Hungary
Latvia Greece
Slovenia Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Ireland Austria 
Czech Rep. Poland
Spain
Spain
Northern Ireland
Slovakia Germany East
Italy Slovenia
Germany East Cyprus (Republic)
Estonia
Poland
Estonia Luxembourg
Germany West Belgium
Belgium Germany West
France Ireland
Great Britain Finland
Austria France
Finland Netherlands
Luxembourg Great Britain
Netherlands Sweden
Sweden Denmark
Denmark Northern Ireland
N = 26663. EU-27 means weighted for country size.
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a)
Figure nine shows the relation between the differing measures of corruption very 
well.  Obviously,  there is  a relation between the two measures, but it  is not very 
strong.  The  R2 between  the  two measurements  is  0,24.  Therefore,  24  % of  the 
variation of one of  the factors  are  explained through the other.  This  is  not  high 
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considering the fact that the two rankings should stand for the same phenomenon.26 
Furthermore, this is only the correlation for the figures on the aggregate level. The 
correlation on individual level is much smaller as will be shown later.
Figure 9 Correlation between corruption perception and corruption experience
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Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a).
6. Analysis of the Data: Multilevel Regression Model
Opinions,  perceptions,  and  behaviour  always  constitute  themselves  within  a 
social  context.  In  macro  level  cross-country  analysis,  only  (aggregated)  country 
level data is considered. This study focuses on the analysis of individual level data in 
26 The Spearmanʼs rank coefficient between the two rankings is 0,61. 
68
order to develop a deeper understanding of how corruption perception constitutes 
itself and how corruption experience comes into play. In order to fully exhaust the 
potential  of the data,  macro level determinants have to be considered as well.  A 
method of analysis considering both, individual features and context, is  multilevel 
regression  modelling  (cf.  Hox  2002,  Raudenbush  and  Bryk  2002,  Snijders  and 
Bosker 1999). 
The assumption of  this  method is  that  individual  data  is  structured  in  groups 
according to certain group characteristics, in this case the affiliation of individuals 
with their countries. This happens because various communication processes evolve 
mainly at  a  national  level,  as  for  instance  public  debates  in  the  national  media, 
information  campaigns  by  NGOs,  new  policies  from  the  administration,  or  the 
specific implementation of laws. Values, norms, and rules, either as informal rules or 
as formal laws, differ largely between countries. 
The  variables  on  individual  level  are  gender,  age,  education,  social  status, 
whether one is working or not, employment status, the difficulty to pay monthly 
bills,  and  the  size  of  the  respondent’s  community.  The  variables  on  both  levels 
derive from the literature and the hypotheses previously formulated. The variables 
on  the  country  level  are  ethnic  division  and  media  prevalence.27 To  control 
corruption  perception  for  real  experienced  corruption,  the  variable,  whether  the 
respondent has experienced corruption within the past 12 months, is inserted on the 
individual level.
With 27 countries taking part and two regions being included as separate entities 
(Eastern Germany and Northern Ireland), the total number of objects on the group 
level is 29. Therefore, it meets the more rigorous statistical demand of 30 identities 
much better than many other studies. In comparison to a lot of other research using 
multilevel modelling, this is a major advantage of the present model . 
27 On country level, many more variables exist and are used for testing the effects of corruption, but those are 
the only variables where theoretical justification exists that they influence the perception of corruption when 
controlling for actually existing corruption (see chapter four). Furthermore, adding more variables on the 
aggregate level could be problematic since the number of observations on the aggregate level is not very 
high. 
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6.1 Variance on Individual and Country Level – Empty Model
The first  model  is  the empty model,  which does not  include any independent 
variables. The outcome is the average score on the index of corruption perception 
across all countries. 
The equations will be presented using the systems of equation style.
Individual level: Yij = β0j + rij Equation 1
Country level: β0j = γ00 + u0j
In this model, the constant regression coefficient β0 is only modelled as a function 
of the total (grand) mean of corruption perception γ00 and the error u0j. The variance 
of u0j is the variance of the dependent variable corruption perception on the country 
level. The total variance of Y corresponds to the sum of the variances on individual 
level and on country level. Therefore, the empty model indicates how the variance is 
divided between the two levels of analysis. 
Yij – corruption perception of individual i in country j
β0j – mean corruption perception value of country j
γ00 – total (grand) mean
rij – unique effect associated with person i  in country j.28 Sum of the squared 
variance  of  the  individual  values  from  the  total  mean  γ00 (level  one  
variance between persons)
u0j – unique effect of country  j. Sum of the squared variance of the country  
means from the total mean (level two variance between countries). 
The modelling starts with the calculation of the intercept-only model with the 
dependent  variable  corrperception.  It  is  the  basic  model  calculating  the  overall 
(grand) mean, i.e. the overall corruption perception score on the 9-point scale of the 
index, for all countries and acts as a reference point for further comparison. The 
28 The assumption is that rij is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2, that is, rij ~ N (0, 
σ2). 
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intercept in the empty model (model 0 in table 7), corresponding to the term γ00 in 
equation 1, therefore is 6,69 points. This value is the average value of the index of 
corruption perception for all European countries.29 The value is in the upper part of 
the index. The separate means for each country, which can be interpreted as some 
sort  of  corruption  perception ranking of  Europe,  have  already been displayed in 
figure eight. The covariance parameters are 3,83 on the individual level and 1,2 on 
the country level.30 This results in a variance partition coefficient (VPC) of 0,24. The 
VPC reflects the intraclass correlation. This is the proportion of group level variance 
compared to the total variance.31 
The equation is the following:
VPC = ρ = σ2uo /( σ2uo + σ2e ) Equation 2
ρ – intraclass correlation
σ2uo – variance of the group level residuals uoj (variance between countries)
σ2e – variance of the individual level residuals eij (variance between individuals).
With the empirical data of the model the equation would be: 
VPC = 1,22 / (1,22 + 3,83) = 0,24 Equation 3
It says that 24 % of the variance of the index of corruption perception is on the 
country  level.  This  means  that  almost  a  quarter  of  the  variance  in  corruption 
perception  is  due  to  differences  between  countries  and  not  due  to  differences 
between individuals. This is a considerable amount and therefore again is a strong 
empirical confirmation for the theoretical assumption that a part of the variance is 
29 This is close, but not identical, to the raw mean 6,7 presented in table 6. The reason for this difference is that 
the estimation of the empty model implies a weighting done by SPSS that is not taken into account in the 
calculation of the raw mean. For further information see Snijders/Bosker 1999: 47.
30 Both values are significant on a 0,001-level. They reflect the squared variance of the individual values rij and 
the squared variance of the country means u0j from the total mean.
31 The intraclass correlation is an estimate of the proportion of explained variance in the population and not in 
the sample – that is given by the correlation ratio η2 that is not treated here (cf. Hox 2002: 15). 
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explained on the country level. It clearly demands for a hierarchical treatment of the 
data. 
Finally,  it  should be noted that the deviance (-2 log-likelihood) measuring the 
model misfit has a value of 106 668,3. When explanatory variables will be added in 
the following models, the deviance is expected to go down indicating a better fit to 
the empirical data.
6.2 Individual Level Effects – Random Intercept Model
In the next step,  predictors will be added to the model. First, the focus rests on 
variables on the individual level, i.e. on features and attitudes of persons. In this 
model individual variables  Xij are included as predictors of corruption perception. 
The  modelling  on  level  two  –  the  country  level  –  corresponds  again  to  the 
unconditioned model.32
Individual level: Yij = β0j + β1j Xij + rij Equation 4
β1j – expected change in the index of corruption perception with a unit increase 
in individual level socio-economic factors.
Xij – independent variable.
With the variable labels instead of algebraic symbols, this equation reads: 
corruption perceptionij = total mean + β11 education + β12 social status + β1j etc. + rij
The  existance  of  differences  in  the  intercept  (Yij)  between  countries  is  the 
assumption in this case, but the effects of the explanatory variables (Xij) do not vary 
across countries. The model is similar to a simple OLS-regression.
Education  was  centred  at  15,5  years  since  most  European  countries  have 
compulsory education until the age of 15 or 16.33 Age was centred at 15 years since 
32 Country level (2): β0j = γ00 + u0j
33 Age at the end of compulsory education: Austria 15, Belgium 18, Cyprus 15, Denmark 16, Finland 16, 
France 16, Germany 18, Greece 15 Ireland 15, Italy 15, Luxembourg 15, Malta 16, Netherlands 17, Portugal 
16, Spain 16, Sweden 16, United Kingdom 16 (Unesco 2003)
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there  were  no  younger  respondents  included  in  the  survey.  Self-placement  was 
centred around the grand mean, i.e. the mean across all countries. 
The effects  of  social  class,  unemployment,  and the group of  the  working are 
tested  in  three  different  models  since  all  three  variables  derived  from  the 
occupational status of the respondent. Therefore due to multicollinearity, a multiple 
use of this data in the same model is not possible. The variable on self-placement in 
society and the variable, whether one has difficulties in paying bills, will be added in 
further  models  since their  content  is  also close  to  the  social  class  variables  and 
similar problems as with the occupational variables would result. 
The results  of the random intercept  models (table 7) with different individual 
level  effects  show  that  several  variables  significantly  influence  corruption 
perception. Actual corruption experience was always included as a control variable. 
The results of model one to five show that the following variables have a significant 
negative  correlation  with  corruption  perception,  i.e.  they  lead  to  less  corruption 
perception:  education,  whether  one  is  working,  and  self-placement  in  society. 
Gender (men) only has in one out of five models a slight negative influence. Age 
does not have any effect at all. Variables having a significantly positive correlation 
with corruption perception are the social class of employers, low-level nonmanual 
employees,  and  workers  (all  three  in  comparison  to  higher-level  nonmanual 
employees), unemployment, the difficulty to pay bills, and corruption experience. 
The effect of living in a small town in comparison to villages was positive, but with 
a very small effect. 
Education has a negative effect in all random intercept models ranging from -0,02 
index points per year to -0,03 index points. The strength of the effect is larger than it  
seems on first sight since it has to be counted for each year of additional education. 
Ten  years  of  education  –  that  would  be  approximately  the  difference  between 
someone with compulsory education and someone with an academic degree – would 
result in an effect of 0,2 to 0,3 points depending on the model. 
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Out of the social class variables (model 1), employers, lower-level nonmanual 
employees and workers all  had a significant positive effect.  Employers saw 0,22 
points  more  corruption  than  higher-level  nonmanual  employees,  lower-level 
employees saw 0,25 points more, and workers 0,28 points more compared to higher-
level employees (all coefficients were significant, 0,001-significance level). Several 
combinations  were  tested  with  different  comparison groups  and the  higher-level 
employees proved to display the most illustrative contrast. Medium-level employees 
seem to answer in a similar pattern as higher-level employees. The variable of the 
employers of the primary industries did not turn out with any consistent result. It is 
peculiar  that  both  workers  and  lower-level  employees,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
employers, on the other hand, perceive more corruption than higher-level employees 
(and medium-level employees).  Subsequently,  a collapsed two class variable was 
tested.  However,  it  did  not  prove  to  be  illustrative  for  the  data.  Corruption 
experience has comparatively less influence (0,15 points, 0,01-significance level) in 
the social class model than the variables for employers, lower-level employees, and 
workers. 
The unemployed perceive more corruption than the employed (model two). With 
0,15 points (0,01-significance level), the effect has the same size as the effect of 
actual corruption experience (0,15 points, 0,01-significance level). The working see 
less corruption (-0,10 points, 0,001-significance level) than those who do not work, 
which is complementary to the previous result (model 3).
The difficulty to  pay bills  (model  4)  has  a  rather  large  impact  on  corruption 
perception  with  0,36  points  more  on  the  index  of  corruption  perception  (0,001-
significance level). Those who have most of the time problems with paying their 
bills at the end of the month see significantly more corruption. The variable with 
those having problems paying their bills only sometimes did not turn out significant. 
The effect of corruption experience sank considerably in this model (0,08 points) 
and lost its significance. 
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Table 7 Multilevel regression models: empty model and fixed effects models with 
individual level socio-economic variables
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The subjective social status, measured through self-placement in society on a 10-
point scale had a negative correlation with corruption perception (model 5). The 
effect of 0,04 points is significant (0,001-significance level) and relatively strong, 
when considering it stands for a one unit change on a 10-point scale. It means that a 
difference between someone who places him- or herself on level one (lowest level) 
and someone who places him- or herself on level ten (highest level) is 0,4 points. 
Gender only showed a very small effect in a single model (model 5), with men 
perceiving slightly less corruption (-0,04 points, 0,001-significance level). The effect 
of age was zero throughout all models. To live in a small town resulted in slight 
positive correlations (0,06 to 0,07 points, 0,05-significance level) with corruption 
perception in three models (model 3, model 4, model 5), but to live in a large town 
did not have any significant effects at all. 
The effect of corruption experience ranged from 0,08 to 0,15 points with varying 
significance levels (not significant to 0,01-significance level). It was always weaker 
than the socio-economic variables, which were in focus in the particular model. 
The implications of these findings will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter where they will be treated in the light of the hypotheses from chapter four.
A look at  the deviance (that displays the model misfit)  indicates that the first  
fixed effects model (model 1), with the social class variables as predictors, reduces 
the model misfit of the empty model about 50 % (from 106 668,3 to 50 771,9). The 
social class model has the best fit to the empirical data in comparison with the other 
fixed effect models. A lot of the data structure seems to be explained through the 
social class variables. 
The VPC had a value between 0,23 to 0,26, thus, not much differing from the 
value of the empty model (0,24). It can be seen that the variance on the country level 
is still high. This confirms that country level determinants should be added to the 
model. 
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More Subjective Indicators Increase Corruption Perception – an Alternative Index
Factor analysis has shown that the different questions in the EB concerning corruption perception loaded with  
various strength on the common factor “corruption perception”. The questions whether corruption existed on local,  
regional, or national level had the strongest loadings. The question whether corruption was a “major problem” in the 
country  showed a slightly  weaker  loading.  Besides other  problems,  it  was discussed  that  the  question had  a 
subjective notion. The simplistic wording might have led to differing interpretations of the question, subsequently  
leading to  the weaker loading.  These considerations eventually  led to  the decision to  chose only  those three  
questions for the construction of the index concerning the existence of corruption on the three administrative levels. 
In order to gain more detailed results on how corruption perceptions form, the interest in the inclusion of an even  
more subjective question on corruption perception rose. The assumption that this question  might respond even 
stronger  to social  factors,  like education and social  class,  lead to the decision to  construct another  index that 
includes the question whether corruption is a “major  problem”. Up to a certain point,  all  corruption perception 
indicators reflect subjective perceptions. But this question adds an even more subjective indicator to the index. This  
new index consists of four questions resulting in an additive index from 0 (meaning any perceived corruption at all) 
to 12 (meaning that the respondent perceived rampant corruption). 
The result of the new models was that the effect on corruption perception caused by education and social class  
rose and that the effect of actual corruption experience sank even lower. It shows that when a question, which  
already assumes that corruption is a “problem” is taken into the index, experience becomes less important. Instead, 
feelings of distrust in institutions, dissatisfaction and disenchantment with politics become more important.
Table 8 Multilevel regression model with an alternative index of 
corruption perception and individual level socio-economic variables
Model
8,93 *** 0,29 8,39 *** 0,50
-0,05 *** 0,01
-0,25 0,15
-0,22 * 0,09
0,06 0,07
0,06 0,16
0,17 * 0,08
0,15 ** 0,05
0,01 *** 0,00
0,03 0,06
0,17 ** 0,06
0,24 ** 0,08
6,32 *** 0,70 6,13 *** 0,08
2,43 *** 0,06 2,64 ** 0,90
119245,2 54493,8
26663 26663
29 29
0,28 0,30
Alternative index of corruption perception
M0: Intercept-only M1: Social class
Fixed Part
Predictor coefficient std err coefficient std err
Intercept
eduyrsa
class_highnonmanb
class_mednonmanb
class_lownonmanb
class_employersprimaryb
class_workersb
gender (men)
aged
smalltowne
largetowne
correxperience
Random Part
Variance residual (individual)
Variance intercept (country)
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)
N respondents
N countriesf
VPCg
*** p ≤ 0,001, ** p ≤ 0,01, * p ≤ 0,05, Unstructured variance, REML
a centered at compulsory education (9,5 years, for details see footnote on page x),
b class_employers as reference, c centered at grand mean, d centered at 15 years, 
e village and rural areas as reference, f  Northern Ireland and East Germany included as separate 
entities, g VPC = country-level variance / ( country-level variance + individual level variance)
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a)
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6.3 Effect of Education Across Countries – Random Slope Model
Besides social status and its various indicators, education was the variable having 
the most notable effect on corruption perception considering its change of -0,02 to 
-0,03  points  for  each  year  of  education.  Already in  other  studies  on  corruption 
perception,  this  variable  proved  to  be  important.  However,  the  results  were 
contradictory with Donchev/Ujhelyi (2008: 21) and Olken (2006: 22) claiming that 
education had a positive correlation with corruption perception and Smith (2008) 
showing a negative correlation between his social status index, where education was 
included, and corruption perception. 
 Analogically to the pattern of varying influence found by Smith (2008) for social 
status, it was proposed that the effect of education could play a similar role. The 
hypothesis that education changes its influence from negative to positive, when the 
general level of corruption perception in a country goes up, was formulated. Now, 
This pattern has to be tested with the data at hand. If education really has a different 
effect in different countries, it must show in a random slope model. 
A bivariate regression scatterplot of education and corruption perception should 
give a first impression whether the proposed pattern can be found in this data (table 
ten).  For  a  first  visual  analysis,  scatterplots  are  computed for  each country.  The 
scatterplots  are  depicted  according  to  their  ranking  on  the  index  of  corruption 
perception already presented in figure eight. As mentioned earlier, this ranking of the 
countries should rather be seen as a general indicator than an exact ranking, where 
single  country  differences  can  be  interpreted.  Looking  at  the  row  of  country 
scatterplots, it can be seen that by trend the regression slopes turn from a negative 
towards a zero correlation in the upper two-thirds of the ranking. Towards the end, 
some countries depict even a positive correlation. There are some exceptions having 
results contrary to the trend, but generally the connection is visible.
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Figure  10 Bivariate  regression  of  education  and  corruption  perception  listed 
according to the corruption perception ranking from Eurobarometer
In order to summarize this result and present it graphically in a more precise way,  
the data is aggregated into three groups. The groups are formed accordingly to the 
level of corruption perception in the respective countries. Those with a mean of 6,5 
points  or  below  are  considered  as  countries  with  a  low  corruption  perception 
(Denmark,  Sweden,  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Finland,  Austria,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Belgium,  Germany West),  those  between  6,6  and  7,5  are  considered  as 
countries with a medium level of corruption perception (Estonia, Poland, Germany 
East,  Italy,  Slovakia,  Northern  Ireland,  Spain,  Malta,  Czech  Republic,  Ireland, 
Portugal,  Slovenia,  Latvia),  and  those  with  a  mean  of  7,6  points  or  above  are 
considered  as  countries  with  high  corruption  perception  (Lithuania,  Romania, 
Cyprus Rep., Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece).
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 Again, this is just an improvised categorization in order to analyse the results and 
make interpretation easier. On a world-wide level, European countries are among 
those countries having relatively low levels of corruption. Therefore, countries at the 
end of the European scale are still in the middle category of corruption perception in 
a world-wide ranking.
When put together in three groups – low, medium, and high corruption perception 
–, it shows (table eleven) that all those countries with a low corruption perception 
level have a negative correlation between education and corruption perception. The 
tendency in the medium group goes towards a zero correlation, but there are still 
quite a few countries with a negative correlation as well and other countries which 
have positive correlations. In the last group, with those countries having a high level 
of  corruption  perception,  four  out  of  six  countries  show  a  positive  correlation 
between education and corruption perception. This means that people with a higher 
level of education see more corruption in their country. In this group, only Lithuania 
and Cyprus  (Rep.)  are  exceptions.  Both fall  into the group with high corruption 
perception,  but  have  a  negative  correlation  between  education  and  corruption 
perception.
Figure  11 Within country regression lines of education and corruption perception 
categorized in three groups
In  order  to  test  whether  these  differences  of  the  effect  of  education  show  a 
significant effect in a multilevel regression, education has to be tested as a random 
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effect in the model. Equation five shows that the slope of education, which is the 
change  of  the  index  score  of  corruption  perception  for  a  one  unit  change  in 
education, has two parameters:  γ10 stands for the slope over all countries (as in the 
random intercept  model),  while  u1 stands for the unique slope effect  of a single 
country alone. This effect is not explained through any variable.
Individual level: Yij = β0j + β1j Xij + rij Equation 5
Country level: β11 = γ10 + u1j
γ10 – slope over all countries 
u1j – unique slope effect of country j. 
The result of the random slope analysis of education shows a variance of zero 
(table nine).  Obviously,  the variance is not important.  Also, all other coefficients 
show the same pattern as in the models before: workers perceive more corruption, 
men see slightly more corruption, age has only a very weak effect on corruption 
perception,  people  in  large  towns  perceive  more  corruption,  and  corruption 
experience has a small positive effect. 
The model misfit goes down to 50 737,5, which is only slightly better than the 
best model without random the random slope effect (model 1 with a deviance of 
50 771,9).  The VPC (0,23) remains very close to the value of the intercept-only 
model (0,24). 
Contrary to expectation, the random slope effect of education did not turn out to 
be significant. Therefore, it will be dropped from the model for further calculations. 
The next step is to include country features in the model to further explore how 
country effects influence corruption perception. 
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Table 9 Multilevel regression model with education as random slope effect
Model
7,68 *** 0,37
-0,02 * 0,01
0,24 ** 0,08
0,04 0,08
0,27 *** 0,07
0,22 0,13
0,31 *** 0,08
-0,05 0,04
0,00 * 0,00
0,05 0,04
0,00 0,05
0,14 ** 0,06
3,68 *** 0,05
1,12 *** 0,31
0,00 * 0,00
50737,5
26663
29
0,23
Index of corruption 
perception
M6: Education as random 
slope effect
Fixed Part
Predictor coefficient std err
Intercept
eduyrsa
class_employersb
class_mednonmanb
class_lownonmanb
class_employersprimaryb
class_workersb
gender (men)
agec
smalltownd
largetownd
correxperience
Random Part
Variance residual (individual)
Variance intercept (country)
Variance slope (eduyrs)
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)
N respondents
N countriesf
VPCg
*** p ≤ 0,001, ** p ≤ 0,01, * p ≤ 0,05, Unstructured variance, REML
 Index of corruption perception: from 0, no corruption, to 9, a lot of corruption
a centered at compulsory education (9,5 years, for details see footnote on page x), 
b class_highnonman as reference, c centered at 15 years, d village and rural areas as reference,
e centered at grand mean, f Northern Ireland and East Germany included as separate entities, 
g VPC = country-level variance / ( country-level variance + individual level variance)
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a)
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6.4 Country Level Effects – Full Model 
In  this  model,  country  level  variables  are  added  to  the  predictors.  On  the 
individual level the socio-economic factors remain in the model, except the random 
slope effect of education. Together, these parameters form the final model:
Individual level: Yij = β0j + β1j Xij + rij Equation 6
Country level: β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj+ u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
Using the names of the variables the final model reads: 
Individual level: Yij = β0j + β11 educationij Equation 7
 + β12 social statusij 
 + β13 ageij 
 + β14 sexij 
 + β15 type of communityij 
 + β16 corruption experienceij + rij
Country level: β0j = γ00 + γ01ELFj+ γ02newsj + γ03GDPj + u0j
Various contextual effects have been discussed in the literature. However for two 
effects, the discussion showed a peculiarity. They have been identified as having a 
specific  influence on the perception of corruption with theoretical  reasoning that 
they influence it  when actual  corruption experience is  controlled.  Therefore,  this 
analysis  will  concentrate  on those two factors.  The first  is  the prevalence of the 
media (Rose/Mishler  2008) and the second is  ethnic division (Olken 2006).  The 
indicators for these two phenomenons have already been used in previous studies: 
the number of newspapers as proxy for media prevalence (Rose/Mishler 2008) and 
the  ethnolinguistic  fracternalization  index  as  indicator  for  ethnic  diversity  (e.g. 
Mauro 1995 and Treisman 2000). GDP per capita is included as control variable for 
economic development. 
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Table 10 Multilevel regression model with country level variables
Model
7,37 *** 0,37
-0,03 * 0,01
0,20 * 0,09
0,00 0,09
0,22 ** 0,08
0,16 0,15
0,28 *** 0,08
-0,06 0,04
0,00 ** 0,00
0,05 0,05
0,02 0,05
0,19 ** 0,06
-0,11 0,84
-0,01 *** 0,00
-1,74 * 7,72
3,86 *** 0,05
0,46 ** 0,15
43986,2
26663
29
0,11
Index of corruption perception
M7: Country factors
Fixed Part
Predictor coefficient std err
Intercept
eduyrsa
class_employersb
class_mednonmanb
class_lownonmanb
class_employersprimaryb
class_workersb
gender (men)
agec
smalltownd
largetownd
correxperience
elfe
newspaperse
GDPe
Random Part
Variance residual (individual)
Variance intercept (country)
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood)
N respondents
N countriesf
VPCg
*** p ≤ 0,001, ** p ≤ 0,01, * p ≤ 0,05, Unstructured variance, REML
 Index of corruption perception: from 0, no corruption, to 9, a lot of corruption
a centered at compulsory education (9,5 years, for details see footnote on page x), 
b class_highnonman as reference, c centered at 15 years, d village and rural areas as reference,
e centered at grand mean, f Northern Ireland and East Germany included as separate entities, 
g VPC = country-level variance / ( country-level variance + individual level variance)
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a), UNESCO 2004 (http://stats.uis.unesco.org) 
Roeder 2001, Worldbank 2008 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
The variable for ethnic division, the ELF-index, did not turn out to be significant. 
Furthermore, the standard error of the coefficient is bigger than the coefficient itself. 
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The indicator for media prevalence, the number of newspapers, had a slight negative 
effect (-0,01) on the level of corruption perception and turned out significant at the 
0,001-level. GDP per capita had the strongest influence among all indicators with a 
coefficient  of  -1,74 (0,05-significance  level).  However,  its  standard  error  is  also 
bigger than its coefficient calling for precaution when interpreting the indicator.
Figure 12 Final model: individual and country level effects
Individual level
 -0,06Gender (men)
Corruption 
experience
Age
Large town
Class: Workers
Class: Empl. 
prim. industr.
Class: Lower 
Nonmanual
Class: Medium 
Nonmanual
Class: 
Employers
Education
 0,28***Corruption perception
Country level
NewspapersEthnic division
-0,01***
-0,03*
 0,00**
 0,02
Small town
0,20*
0,00
0,22**
0,16
0,05
-0,11
GDP per capita
-1,74*
 0,19**
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The individual level variables remained in the pattern of the previous models. 
Although, the effect sizes of the country level variables are small, a big share of the 
variance is explained on group level. This is demonstrated through the VPC going 
down by more than 50 % from 0,24 in the intercept-only model to 0,11 in the present 
model. Thus, more than half of the country level variance is explained through the 
insertion of these three country level variables. The remaining 11 % of the variance 
is explained through random variation between the countries, which could not be 
explained through any of the country variables. 
In the next chapter, the results will be discussed in more detail. 
7. Results
The analysis of the models already showed the significant factors in this study 
and  gave  various  hints  about  the  direction  of  the  results.  In  this  chapter,  the 
hypotheses, which were formulated in chapter four, will be evaluated systematically 
according to the outcomes of the respective models in the previous chapter. 
Gender did not produce any significant results except for one model (model five). 
The influence was negative signifying that men perceive slightly less corruption. But 
since in all other models the variable did not prove to be relevant, the conclusion for 
this  dataset  can  only  be  that  gender  does  not  have  any  notable  influence  on 
corruption perception.  The hypotheses that male respondents (H8) perceive more 
corruption cannot  be fully rejected with the data.  The result  in  this  study rather 
reflects the inconsistency of previous research. Olken (2006) found men perceiving 
more corruption, but Smith (2008) found them to perceive less. Swamy et al. (2001) 
showed female gender as a reducing factor of corruption, but this was criticized by 
others (cf. Lambsdorff 2005a: 26). The findings of this study further  point in the 
direction that in fact genders does not have a high relevance in itself for corruption 
perception.  When  other  factors,  like  employment  or  education,  are  included, 
possible effects of gender become insignificant.
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The size of the community the respondent lives in was not very relevant either in 
this study (H9). Similar to gender, the size of community has produced contradictory 
findings  so  far.  Living  in  a  large  town  had  a  negative  influence  on  corruption 
perception according to  Donchev/Ujhelyi  (2008:  21) and a  positive according to 
Smith (2008: 17). In the EB dataset, the effect of living in small towns resulted in 
slightly more corruption perception than that of living in villages (significant in the 
models three, four, and five). But living in a large town did not prove significant in 
any of the models. The hypotheses that a bigger size of the community lead to less  
corruption perception can therefore neither be accepted nor rejected with this data. 
Age was the third factor on which previous research was contradictory with a 
non-linear  correlation  in  Donchev/Ujhelyi  (2006)  and  a  negative  correlation  in 
Smith  (2008).  The data  of  this  study does  not  show any effect  at  all.  Bivariate 
regression scatterplots for all countries show that the correlation is in some countries 
positive,  in  some  negative,  and  in  some  zero  without  any  obvious  pattern.34 
Therefore,  the  hypothesis  that  age  leads  to  less  corruption  perception  (H7)  can 
neither be falsified nor verified with this data. 
Without any theory and rather inconsistent results the influence of gender, size of 
town, and age on corruption perception remains unclear. 
The effects of the questions, whether the respondent works or whether he or she 
is unemployed, were tested in the multilevel regression models two and three (table 
seven). There were two hypotheses: On the one hand, that people who work perceive 
more corruption (H5) since they have more contacts with other people than those 
who do not work (Smith 2008, Rose/Mishler 2008) and therefore, they have more 
possibilities for corruption.  On the other hand, there is theoretical reasoning that 
people  who  are  unemployed  perceive  more  corruption  (H6)  since  they  mistrust 
society  (Čábelková/Hanousek  2004).  In  fact,  the  two  hypotheses  act  like  two 
opposites. If those who are working see more corruption than the rest, they also see 
more  than  the  unemployed  since  the  unemployed  are  also  included  in  the 
34 Table III in appendix.
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comparison group of those “not working”. If the unemployed see more corruption, 
working people should see less due to the same reason.
The result shows that those who work perceive less corruption (H5). They have a 
score which is 0,1 points lower (0,001-significance level) on the index of corruption 
perception than those who are not working (i.e. studying, unemployed, at home, or 
retired). This result is against hypothesis five. Those who are unemployed, on the 
contrary,  see  more  corruption  in  society.  They  score  0,15  points  higher  (0,01-
significance  level)  on  the  index  of  corruption  perception  than  those  who  are 
employed.35 The conclusion is that the result rather points in the direction of the 
theory of corruption perception reflecting the feeling of being excluded from society 
or of distrust towards the institutions of a state than in the direction that corruption 
perception is a valid and precise indicator of corruption.
On the aggregate level, it was tested whether higher ethnic heterogeneity created 
a  higher  level  of  perceived  corruption  as  proposed  by  Olken  (2006:  22).  The 
hypothesis (H11) was tested with the ELF index and the result was not significant. 
The influence of ethnic division cannot be shown for the European population. 
The influence of media prevalence on corruption perception was hypothesised 
(H12)  to  be  positive  according  to  the  research  by  Rose/Mishler  (2008).  They 
suggested an echo chamber effect creating higher levels of corruption perception 
through  cross-level  interaction  between  corruption  perception  and  newspaper 
circulation.  This  dataset  showed  a  different  effect.  Media  prevalence,  proxied 
through the number of printed newspapers per country, produced a slight negative 
effect  on  corruption  perception  which  was  significant  (-0,01  points,  0,001-
significance  level).  Therefore,  the  number  of  newspapers  lowers  corruption 
perception.
Now, let  us turn to the more influential  variables in  the multilevel  regression 
model. The first hypothesis was that social status determines corruption perception 
35 Students, those at home, and the retired were excluded as missing values.
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(H1). The results of the analysis show that all factors, which determine the social 
standing of an individual, are significant. From the variables for social class, three 
out of five turned out to be significant.  The social  status group of medium-level 
nonmanual employees showed an answering pattern very similar to the one of the 
higher-level  nonmanual  employees.  Therefore,  it  did  not  turn  out  significant. 
Subjective social standing, measured through self-placement in society, is significant 
as well. Education, a variable in its own right, but also another indicator for social 
status,  was  significant  as  well.  The  importance  of  those  determinants  is  further 
underlined by the size of their effects. They are always the most influential factors in 
the models. Therefore, all evidence points in the direction that social status is a very 
important determinant of corruption perception. 
Hypothesis  two suggested  that  a  higher  social  status  leads  to  less  corruption 
perception. The social class variables provide a more complex picture. Higher-level 
nonmanual  employees  were  chosen  as  comparison  group  since  this  comparison 
showed the strongest contrast to the other class groups.36 Lower-level nonmanual 
employees and workers perceive considerably more corruption: 0,25 points more for 
lower-level employees and 0,31 points for workers (both significant at the 0,001-
level).  Surprisingly,  employers  also  perceive  more  corruption  than  higher-level 
employees  (0,22  points,  0,01-significance  level).  Medium-level  employees  not 
producing a significant result has already been explained and is due to the similarity 
of  their  answering  pattern  with  the  higher-level  employees.  Employers  from the 
primary industries did not show a significant result either. This could be due to the 
fact that structural changes in society have altered class patterns and that the class 
model of Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (cf. Erikson/Golthorpe 1993) does 
not reflect current structures anymore.
In general, this result shows that workers and employees in low-level positions 
perceive more corruption than employees in medium or high ranks. But the highest 
social status group, the employers, also see more corruption than medium- or high-
level employees. On the one hand, this could be due to country effects that have not 
36 Several combinations with different dummy variables were tested.
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been  tested  here,  as  for  instance  different  class  compositions.  Another  ad-hoc 
interpretation  could  be  that  in  contrast  to  lower-level  employees  and  workers, 
employers do not answer in protest,  but out of knowledge of the real corruption 
level.  An  interpretation  could  be  that  in  contrast  to  medium-  and  high-level 
employees,  who apparently see  less  corruption  than  all  other  groups,  employers 
might know the real extent of corruption and therefore also report to perceive more 
corruption. At this point, the current analysis comes to its end. It shows that more 
research is needed in order to understand the interconnections between social class 
and corruption perception. 
The variable of subjective social status, measured through the self-assessment of 
one’s social status, pointed in a similar direction as the previous results with social 
class. People with higher self-assessment perceived less corruption. One step on the 
10-point scale leads to a drop of 0,04 points (0,001-significance level) on the index 
of corruption perception. Between a person putting itself in the lowest position and a 
person who puts itself in the highest position is a difference of 0,4 points.
Finally,  that  leads  to  the  hypothesis  that  more  education  reduces  corruption 
perception (H3). In fact in model 1, education causes a drop of 0,02 points on the 9-
point index of corruption perception for each year of education. This means that the 
difference between someone who finished education at the age of 15 – the common 
end of compulsory education in Europe – and someone who finished education at 
the age of 25 – usually someone with an academic degree – is 0,2 points on the 
index. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that higher education leads to less 
corruption perception. The reason why the influence is not stronger becomes clearer 
with the next result. 
In the hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, it was suggested that education has a different 
effect in each country depending on the general level of corruption perception. A 
similar effect has already been found by Smith (2008) with data from the ISSP for 
the  impact  of  socio-economic  status.  The  effect  that  education  has  a  negative 
correlation  with  corruption  perception  in  countries  with  a  low  level  of  general 
corruption perception, a zero correlation in countries with a medium level of general 
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corruption perception, and  a positive correlation in countries with a high level of 
general  corruption  perception  generally  could  be  observed  in  the  graphic 
presentation  of  the  data.  Bivariate  scatterplots  of  education  and  corruption 
perception  showed education  having a  varying effect  in  different  countries.  The 
multilevel regression analysis, however, could not confirm the significance of this 
effect.  Therefore,  this  finding  can  only  serve  as  a  preliminary  guide  for  future 
research. 
The last hypothesis to address is the effect of corruption experience on corruption 
perception  (H10).  The  assumption  that  corruption  experience  has  a  positive 
influence on corruption perception is the basic idea of corruption measurement. This 
study provides data indicating that corruption experience has a significant influence 
on corruption perception. In most models, corruption experience caused a significant 
rise of 0,09 to 0,19 points in corruption perception between someone who has not 
experienced corruption and someone who has encountered a bribery demand. In one 
model – the model where the difficulty to pay monthly bills was used as social status 
predictor  –,  corruption  experience  was  not  significant.  It  shows  that  corruption 
perception measurement has some correlation to the actual appearance of corruption. 
But it becomes clear that the size of the effect is less than the effects of some other 
influential factors like social status or education. Socio-economic factors can even 
become so influential that corruption experience loses its effect at all, as it could be 
seen in model four.
Some studies  (e.g.  Smith  2008)  suggest  that  corruption  perception  should  be 
rather interpreted as an indicator for trust in institutions, politics, or society than an 
indicator for corruption. Empirical results from this analysis show that social status 
indicators are stronger predictors of corruption perception than the actual experience 
of corruption. This finding supports the thesis corruption perception might reflect 
something  else  than  corruption.  In  order  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  corruption 
perception  is  an  indicator  for  trust,  two  trust  variables  were  tested  in  further 
multilevel models. 
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Confirmation of the Results With Data From 2005 and 2007
After having examined in detail the most recent data from 2009, the major findings were compared with data from 
2005  and  2007.  Separate  multilevel  regression  models  for  each  year  were  examined  for  differences  and 
similarities. 
The main trend shows that the corruption perception level sank from 2005 to 2007 and rose again in 2009. This 
can be seen in the intercept-only models for each year. The mean score of the index of corruption perception  
went down from 6,37 points (2005) to 6,27 points (2007) and up again to 6,69 points (2009). Detailed rankings  
with means of the index of corruption perception are available in the appendix in table IV. 
The social class model was chosen for comparing socio-economic effects across time. The results of the three  
models  are  presented  in  table  eleven.  All  effect  models  have  approximately  the  same  model  misfit  with  a 
deviance around 100 000 in the empty model and around 50  000 in the effect model. In all 3 years, the social 
status model reduces the model misfit about 50 %.
All major coefficients point in the same direction and have similar strength in all three years. Gender and age do  
not show noteworthy results. Living in a large town results in more perceived corruption in 2005, but the effect  
vanishes in the following years. Education has a negative influence on corruption perception with an effect of 0,2  
to 0,3 points per year of education. Employers, lower-level nonmanual employees and workers perceive more 
corruption than higher-level nonmanual employees. The coefficients lose strength in 2007 and 2009, but they still  
remain the most influential predictors of corruption perception.
Table 11 Multilevel regression models of corruption perception in the years 2005, 2007, 2009
2005 2007 2009
Model
6,37 *** 0,22 7,72 *** 0,40 6,27 *** 0,23 7,33 *** 0,39 6,69 *** 0,21 7,53 *** 0,38
-0,03 *** 0,01 -0,03 *** 0,01 -0,02 *** 0,01
0,38 *** 0,09 0,29 *** 0,09 0,22 ** 0,08
0,13 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,02 0,08
0,32 *** 0,08 0,29 *** 0,07 0,25 *** 0,07
0,08 0,14 0,02 0,13 0,12 0,13
0,37 *** 0,08 0,34 *** 0,08 0,28 *** 0,08
0,01 0,04 -0,08 * 0,04 -0,04 0,04
0,00 * 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 * 0,00
0,01 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,05 0,04
0,12 * 0,05 -0,02 0,05 0,01 0,04
0,47 *** 0,06 0,24 *** 0,06 0,15 ** 0,06
4,22 *** 0,04 4,05 *** 0,05 4,02 *** 0,04 3,89 *** 0,05 3,83 *** 0,03 3,70 *** 0,05
1,30 *** 0,36 1,36 *** 0,38 1,54 *** 0,41 1,60 *** 0,43 1,22 *** 0,33 1,31 ** 0,35
97031,7 48069,4 104745,0 52091,5 106668,3 50771,9
26643 26643 26730 26730 26663 26663
27 27 29 29 29 29
0,24 0,25 0,28 0,29 0,24 0,26
Intercept-only Social class Intercept-only Social class Intercept-only Social class
Fixed Part
Predictor coefficient std err coefficient std err coefficient std err coefficient std err coefficient std err coefficient std err
Intercept
eduyrsa
class_employersb
class_mednonmanb
class_lownonmanb
class_employprimaryb
class_workersb
gender (male)
agec
smalltownd
largetownd
correxperience
Random Part
Variance residual (individual)
Variance intercept (country)
Deviance (Log Likelihood)
N respondents
N countriese
VPCf
*** p ≤ 0,001, ** p ≤ 0,01, * p ≤ 0,05, Unstructured variance, REML
a centered at compulsory education (9,5 years, for details see footnote on page x), b class_highnonman as reference, c centered at 15 years, d village as reference, 
e Northern Ireland and East Germany included as separate entities, f VPC = country-level variance / ( country-level variance + individual level variance)
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009a), Eurobarometer 68.2 (2007), Eurobarometer 64.3 (2005)
Corruption experience is significant in all three years. In 2005, it had the largest coefficient in the model with 0,47  
points more on the index of corruption perception. The effect size sank in 2007 to 0,24 points and went below the  
effect sizes of the social class variables. It sank again in 2005 down to 0,15 points. However, all coefficients lose  
effect size considerably in the year 2009. The rising level of corruption perception could be an explanation. This  
result can be read as another evidence that corruption perception reacts much stronger to dissatisfaction with  
society or political institutions than to real experienced corruption. 
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Since there are no questions on trust included in the EB 72.2, a direct correlation 
on individual level cannot be shown. Therefore, two different trust indicators were 
included as aggregated country level variables with figures from the World Value 
Survey (WVS) (result in appendix, table V). Trust questions were included in two 
separate waves of the WVS. In a study wave from 1990 to 1999, the question was 
included whether to trust other people in one’s country or not. To compute a trust 
figure,  the  two  answer  possibilities  “trust  completely”  and  “trust  a  little”  were 
aggregated. The percent of people in a country saying that they trusted other people 
completely or a little was taken as country variable. This indicator did not prove 
significant. 
Another question on trust was included in the wave from 2005 to 2007.37 The 
question was whether most people can be trusted.  Here,  the percentage of “yes” 
answers was taken as country variable. This indicator turned out significantly with a 
slightly negative influence (-0,02 points). In both models, the VPC did not go down. 
This indicates that the country level effect of trust did not explain any considerable 
amount of country variance.  Aggregated data obviously does not lead far in this 
context. Further research with individual level data on trust is certainly needed to 
develop  more  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  trust  and  corruption 
perception.
Before turning to  the final chapter where conclusions from this  study will  be 
discussed,  some  remarks  should  be  made  on  the  limitations  of  this  analysis. 
Depending  on  the  rigour  of  one’s  statistical  standards,  one  could  question  the 
assumptions  leading to  a  multilevel  regression analysis.  As mentioned,  there are 
several  views  in  literature  about  how many entities  have  to  be  included  on the 
aggregate or group level. In this study, 29 entities were included on the group level – 
27 countries and two major regions. Some researchers call for 30 or more groups. 
However, empirical research often operates with much less groups. 
37 Data is only available for 13 European countries.
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The structure of the data is another argument to maintain the assumption that in 
this  case  a  multilevel  regression  analysis  is  advisable.  As  could  be  seen  in  the 
scatterplots of education and corruption perception the data is clearly structured by 
groups. The impact of country level effects also was shown by the sinking value of 
the VPC when country variables were introduced into the model.
A common criticism of cross-country studies is the fact that they take such a 
broad  look on a  phenomenon  that  they are  unable  to  explain  particular  country 
features and reasons for country specific developments. It was not the aim of this 
study to explain in detail country characteristics or dwell on certain peculiarities that 
distinguish  one  country  from  another.  Certainly,  this  would  be  a  very  valuable 
approach and in fact corruption studies need much more future research towards this 
direction. Here, the aim was showing the way corruption perceptions are formed by 
socio-structural  determinants.  This  can  be  shown  best  with  quantitative  cross-
country analysis. 
 The question, whether corruption experience is a good indicator of corruption at 
all, is a completely different issue. If people experience corruption, they mostly have 
experiences with street corruption. One could argue that in order to measure grand 
corruption a measurement through perception is necessary. Optimists could say that 
the gap between experienced street corruption and the overall corruption perception 
level is grand corruption, which we cannot measure directly. The theory would then 
be that the public can “feel” the extent of grand corruption. To argue in this way 
would not only be unscientific, but it can also be proven as empirically untrue with 
the mere fact that corruption perceptions quickly respond to publicised scandals. If a 
political corruption case comes to light the perceptions go up, as it could be shown 
for several European countries in 2009 (European Commission 2009b). There will 
be examples of this in the conclusion in the last chapter. But it has been already 
discussed here that the publicity of a scandal does not say much about the actual 
level  of  corruption.  Corruption  scandals  becoming  public  mostly  concern  cases 
which happened several years ago. Therefore, the perception level should have risen 
at the time when the case happened. But then, obviously no one knew about it and, 
therefore, could not include it in his or her perception of the corruption level. 
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Certainly,  it  is  necessary  to  do  more  research  on  corruption  experience  and 
corruption  victimization  in  the  future.  This  study  can  only  show  how  socio-
economic factors and corruption experience form corruption perceptions. To discuss 
implications of this analysis let us turn to the last chapter. 
8. Conclusion
Corruption causes serious problems for individuals and societies. Many studies 
have illustrated that corruption is indeed an important issue deserving all possible 
attention by social scientist. In the ever growing literature on corruption, more and 
more scientists raise questions about the problem of the measurement of corruption. 
The challenge of measuring it is essential to the whole research. When working with 
corruption,  researchers  are  dealing  with  an  issue,  which  faces  social  and  legal 
disapproval with the consequence that corrupt behaviour is kept in secrecy. Getting 
straight answers from respondents about corrupt behaviour is difficult. The same is 
true for the observation of corruption. Subsequently, the most common approach is 
to ask either experts or the general public how much corruption they perceive in 
their  country.  It  is  believed that  the  perception  of  corruption  acts  as  an  feasible 
indicator  for  the  real  level  of  corruption.  Now,  this  assumption  that  subjective 
assessment correlates closely with actual behaviour can be challenged. 
Several studies, which have been discussed in detail in this paper (for instance 
Olken  2006,  Donchev/Ujhelyi  2008,  Rose/Mishler  2008,  Smith  2008),  brought 
empirical evidence that there is in fact a difference between the mere perception of 
corruption  and the  actual  occurrence  of  the  phenomenon.  Most  of  these  studies 
included victimization or experience as indicator. This means that the respondents 
are asked about the actual experience of corruption or attempts of corrupt behaviour. 
Methodologically, this is a much better indicator for corruption since researchers are 
dealing with reports about behaviour and not with perceptions or mere opinions.38
38 It has to be noted that the respondents are not asked about their own behaviour, but about the behaviour of 
someone else, who is the corruptee. The question in the EB asks whether they have been approached with 
demands for undue money. It does not ask whether the respondent offered it him- or herself. Of course, this 
is the only way to get any information at all since offering corruption mostly is illegal. It would be very 
difficult to motivate respondents to report their own illegal activity. 
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The literature shows differences between corruption perception and corruption 
experience and that sometimes the correlation between the two is  not even very 
strong. These studies also make it clear that corruption perception is influenced by 
socio-economic determinants. The conclusion is that corruption perception seems to 
be  much  more  of  an  indicator  for  social  or  political  trust,  dissatisfaction  with 
politics, the society, or the respondent’s social situation. Here, this thesis was tested 
with a new dataset covering more European countries than in any other study before. 
In this paper, a 2009 dataset of 27 European countries was analysed. The data 
came from the EB surveys and includes both questions about corruption perception 
and corruption experience. In order to give full consideration to country effects, the 
data  was  analysed  with  a  multilevel  regression  analysis.  Variables  from  the 
individual  level  and from the country level  were analysed.  The variables  on the 
individual level were the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents as well 
as  their  opinions  and  reports  about  their  behaviour.  On  the  country  level,  the 
variables were ethnic heterogeneity, media prevalence within the countries, and as 
control variable GDP. In total, 26 663 individuals from 27 countries were included in 
the dataset. The findings of this analysis have been confirmed with data from 2005 
and 2007 as well. 
The main result is that corruption perceptions are strongly determined by socio-
economic factors.  Corruption perception closely correlates  with the social  status, 
measured either through social  class or subjective social  status.  It  also correlates 
with  educational  status,  with  unemployment,  with  the  question  whether  one  is 
working, and with the difficulty to pay monthly bills. In terms of social class and 
subjective social  status, respondents with a lower social  status report  to perceive 
more  corruption  than  higher-level  and  medium-level  employees.  However,  also 
employers  perceive  more  corruption  than  these  two groups.  Respondents  with  a 
lower educational level perceive more corruption. Unemployment is the third major 
factor  leading  to  more  corruption  perception.  The  fact,  the  inability  of  the 
respondent  to  pay the bills  at  the end of  the month highly correlates  with more 
corruption perception. This summarizes the previous effects of social status. Those 
who have a lower educational status, a lower social status, or those who do not have 
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employment are often those who also have difficulties to pay their bills. Therefore, 
corruption  perception  seems  to  contain  a  considerable  amount  of  social 
disappointment,  social  exclusion,  disenchantment  with  politics,  or  the  feeling  of 
being  unfairly  treated.  Other  researchers  came to  similar  conclusions  (cf.  Smith 
2008, Smith/Matejku 2009). As already mentioned earlier, the motto of those who 
perceive a lot of corruption can be summarized as “Those at the top, they are all 
corrupt!” An analysis with an alternative index additionally containing the question 
whether corruption was a “major problem” in the country brought further evidence 
for this argument. The question is considered as even more subjective in terms of 
perceiving the spread of corruption since it leaves it to the respondent to assess the 
urgency of the problem in comparison to other problems in the respondent’s life or 
country.  It  turned  out  that  socio-economic  background  variables  had  an  even 
stronger influence on this new index. It is hypothesized that feelings of distrust in 
institutions,  dissatisfaction  and  disenchantment  with  politics  became  even  more 
important in the answer to this question underlining the subjectiveness of corruption 
perception in general. 
In the light of this result, corruption perception should be understood differently 
and taken with some scepticism when used as an indicator of actual corruption. In 
the wide literature on corruption,  this point usually is not considered. Dozens of 
empirical studies on corruption use corruption perception as indicator for corruption. 
All  these results may be interpreted differently with this  new knowledge kept in 
mind. 
However, this does not mean that there is no correlation at all between actual 
corruption and corruption perception. Corruption experience has a positive influence 
on corruption perception. Those, who have personally faced a demand of corrupt 
money, perceive – all other things being equal – more corruption than those who 
have not. Compared to other factors, corruption experience is a weak predictor of 
corruption perception. In all models, other factors than corruption experience had 
stronger correlations with corruption perception. There is a share of real corruption 
included in corruption perception measurements. However, other factors – mainly 
social status and education – bias it away from actual corruption. 
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The conclusion of this analysis serves as the right moment to ask again why it is 
so important to work with an unbiased measurement of corruption after all. First of 
all, researchers want to measure what they aim to measure. It is a question of the 
mere  validity  of  corruption  measurements.  In  the  end,  it  is  also  a  question  of 
standards  of  scientific  quality.  Secondly,  there  are  several  actors  in  politics, 
administration, and the business world who’s work relies on the information of such 
measurements.  Governments,  anti-corruption  agencies,  police  forces,  aid 
organizations, political parties, and business companies arrange their work or parts 
of it accordingly to corruption standards. To give just one example out of many: the 
eligibility of US aid under the Millennium Challenge Account is directly linked to 
corruption perception (Treisman 2007: 222).
Andersson/Heywood (2008)  give  an  impressive  overview  of  how  corruption 
perception measurements have directly influenced policies and politicians all over 
the  world.  Donors  have  stopped their  aid  commitment  after  their  target  country 
dropped in a ranking of corruption perception. Prime, interior, and justices ministers 
of several countries directly referred to corruption perception measurements in their 
political statements and strategies. Entire countries have based their anti-corruption 
policies on how they performed in corruption perception rankings like the CPI. It 
becomes very clear it is crucial to the corruption debate that policy makers are able 
to rely on the measurements. If corruption is measured through perception, many 
other  dimensions  than  corruption  find  their  way  into  the  outcome  of  the 
measurement and blur the view on the actual phenomenon.
Thirdly,  anti-corruption agencies want to know whether their work bears fruit. 
The impact of anti-corruption efforts is very hard to measure. The tools currently 
available fully rely on corruption perception. But after a anti-corruption campaign, 
the level of perception goes up. Higher attention by the media and the public let 
corruption perceptions rise, although the real level might go down if the effort was 
successful  (cf.  Seligson  2006:  390).  Anti-corruption  practitioners  from  various 
international agencies raise this point themselves and call for measures to evaluate 
their efforts (see Hetzer 2010: 26, Langseth 2006: 25).
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It  is  a  well  documented  fact  that  public  corruption  scandals  lead  to  more 
corruption perception. The latest report by the European Commission on the results 
of the EB 72.2 (European Commission 2009b: 11) lists recent corruption scandals in 
Europe. A corruption and party financing scandal among politicians in Finland lead 
to an increase from 25 % to 51 % of the proportion of the population believing 
corruption  is  a  major  problem  in  Finland  in  the  year  2009.  In  Austria,  well 
publicised corruption scandals involving politicians led to an increase from 47 % to 
61 %. In Malta and Great Britain, other scandals led to an increase in the percentage 
of the population thinking their country has a big problem with corruption from 84 
% to 95 % in Malta and from 65 % to 74 % in Great Britain. But has corruption  
itself  increased  exactly  in  this  period?  Probably  not,  since  corruption  scandals, 
which become public mostly treat cases several years back. Even if it had increased, 
it is doubtable that it has increased with the same magnitude. 
More perception of any phenomenon can slowly lead to its acceptance. That is 
also  true  for  corruption.  If  everyone  pays  a  bribe,  the  social  norms  initially 
sanctioning this behaviour can gradually become undermined. Čábelková/Hanousek 
(2004) even found evidence  that  higher  corruption  perceptions  lead  to  a  greater 
willingness to pay bribes. 
This study underlines the need for more research on how corruption perceptions 
form. The simple calculation that corruption perception equals corruption does not 
hold  any longer.  Although,  this  finding  becomes  more  and  more  established  in 
academic research, it is still unknown beyond the scientific community. 
 Especially in population surveys, corruption experience or victimization serves 
as a better indicator. The average citizen cannot have insight into corruption in major 
business transactions or in procurement processes of the administration. Corruption 
perceptions  in  the  general  public  are  furthermore  influenced  by socio-economic 
factors  outbalancing  corruption  experience.  Expert  surveys  are  made  with  the 
assumption that the experts have a deeper insight in their field of expertise or in their 
(business) sector they report on. The results of this analysis suggest to study the 
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formation of corruption perception for business experts and analysts as well. In the 
meantime, their perceptions should be used with precaution. 
The above mentioned difference between the views of citizens and experts call 
attention  to  the  issue  of  street  corruption  and  grand  corruption.  Thoroughly 
analysing  this  question  would  have  gone  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
Nonetheless, the problem should be outlined here.  When general corruption levels 
are surveyed or when the question is asked, whether corruption poses a problem to a 
certain country, these two different kinds of corruption get mixed. Street corruption 
is  the type where police officers,  judges,  ordinary officials, or doctors demand a 
comparatively low amount of money in order to provide a service. Grand corruption, 
on the contrary, deals with much higher sums and is often structured in systematic 
corruption schemes.  When in population surveys  people are  asked about  general 
corruption levels, they have to judge about a problem, which they can at best assess 
only partially. A clearer distinction between street and grand corruption would make 
corruption studies more effective in the future. 
It is also important to explore other objective indicators of corruption. There are 
still many possibilities to improve research on corruption through alternative ways to 
measure corruption. Daniel Kaufmann published a long list in 1998 (148) which is 
still relevant today. In this paper, he proposes that in the future, researchers should 
analyse procurement data, public investment and expenditure reviews, balance of 
payments (BOP) data, custom data, tax collection data, jurimetric data to measure 
processing times,  and data  about  the unofficial  economy among others.  Most  of 
suchlike analyses have not been performed yet. 
Even  with  new  objective  indicators  coming  up,  corruption  perception  will 
continue to play an important role since it is not irrelevant whether people believe 
that certain parts of society are corrupt. Even if, in a distant future, corruption had 
seized from society, but still people thought the society to be corrupt, it would be 
important to know. Keeping the limitations of corruption perception as an indicator 
of corruption in mind, it will be important to combine corruption perception and 
corruption  experience  as  measures  for  corruption. Therefore,  more  research  on 
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corruption  perception  and  corruption  experience  is  needed.  This  analysis 
emphasized  that  socio-economic  indicators  influence  how  people  perceive 
corruption. This should serve as background for further studies. 
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9. Zusammenfassung Deutsch
„Das  Messen  von  Korruption  –  Sozio-ökonomische  Determinanten  der 
Korruptionswahrnehmung  und  die  Rolle  tatsächlichen  Erlebens  von 
Korruption“
Die  problematischen  Auswirkungen  von  Korruption  und  die  Verbreitung  von 
Korruption  in  der  Gesellschaft  erfuhren  in  den  letzten  Jahren  erhöhte 
Aufmerksamkeit durch Politik, Wirtschaft, Medien und Zivilgesellschaft. Auch die 
wissenschaftliche  Auseinandersetzung  mit  dem  Thema  intensivierte  sich  (vgl. 
Lambsdorff  2005a),  nicht  zuletzt  begründet  durch  die  weite  Verbreitung  von 
Korruptionsindizes, wie etwa dem Corruption Perception Index von Transparency 
International,  die  die  Durchführung  von  Länder  vergleichenden  Makrostudien 
begünstigt haben. Neben diesen Indizes, die auf Expertenumfragen basieren, gibt es 
Bevölkerungsumfragen,  die  das  Korruptionsniveau  in  der  Gesamtbevölkerung 
einzuschätzen  versuchen.  Den meisten  Messmethoden,  sowohl  in  Experten-,  wie 
auch  in  Bevölkerungsumfragen,  liegt  eine  Messung  über  die  Wahrnehmung  von 
Korruption zugrunde. 
Eine Reihe neuerer Studien (Olken 2006,  Donchev/Ujhelyi 2008,  Rose/Mishler 
2008, Smith 2008) hat sich mit der Validität der Korruptionswahrnehmungsmessung, 
besonders in Bevölkerungsumfragen, befasst. Diese Mikroanalysen fanden heraus, 
dass  Korruptionswahrnehmung  von  einer  Reihe  an  sozio-ökonmischen  Faktoren 
beeinflusst wird. Das tatsächliche persönliche Erleben von Korruption korreliert nur 
schwach mit Korruptionswahrnehmung. 
In  dieser  Arbeit  wurde  ein  Datensatz  des  Eurobarometer  72.2  von  2009 
(European Commission 2009a) mit 26 663 Personen aus 27 Ländern untersucht. Die 
Umfrage  ist  repräsentativ  für  die  Europäische  Union  und  umfasst  so  viele 
europäische  Länder  wie  keine  vergleichbare  Studie  zuvor.  Um  kontextualen 
Einflüssen,  die  in  einem  Ländervergleich  naturgemäß  eine  große  Rolle  spielen, 
besondere Aufmerksamkeit  zu widmen,  wurden die  Daten mit  einem Multilevel-
Regressions-Modell analysiert. 
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Als abhängige Variable diente ein Korruptionswahrnehmungsindex, der aus drei 
Korruptionswahrnehmungsfragen des Eurobarometers gebildet wurde. Die Fragen, 
ob Korruption  auf  lokaler,  regionaler  bzw. nationaler  Ebene im jeweiligen  Land 
existiert, führen zu einem Index von 0 Punkten (keine Korruption) bis 9 Punkten 
(sehr  viel  Korruption).  Als  unabhängige  Variablen  auf  der  individuellen  Ebene 
flossen Alter, Geschlecht, Bildung, sozialer Status (gemessen durch soziale Klasse, 
bzw.  Selbsteinschätzung  des  sozialen  Status),  die  Größe  des  Wohnortes,  die 
Schwierigkeit  monatlich  Rechnungen  zu  bezahlen,  und  tatsächlich  erlebte 
Korruption  in  das  Modell  ein.  Durch  die  Einbeziehung  der  Variablen  erlebte 
Korruption  bzw.  Korruptionsviktimisierung  konnte  für  tatsächlich  erfahrene 
Korruption kontrolliert werden. Auf Länderebene flossen drei Indikatoren ein: der 
Ethnolinguistic-Fractionalization-Index,  zur  Messung  ethnischer  Pluralität,  die 
Anzahl an Zeitungen pro 1 000 Einwohner, zur Messung von Medienverbreitung, 
und das Bruttoinlandsprodukt als Kontrollvariable.
Das Ergebnis der Analyse zeigt, dass sozio-ökonomische Faktoren eine wichtige 
Rolle bei der Bildung von Korruptionswahrnehmung spielen. Untere Angestellte und 
Arbeiter  nehmen  mehr  Korruption  wahr  als  höhere  und  mittlere  Angestellte. 
Allerdings nehmen auch Arbeitgeber (employers) mehr Korruption wahr als höhere 
und  mittlere  Angestellte.  Bei  Bildung  zeigte  sich  generell  ein  negativer 
Zusammenhang  mit  der  Korruptionswahrnehmung,  der  jedoch  in  Ländern  mit 
höherem  Korruptionswahrnehmungsniveau  abklingt  und  zum  Teil  positiv  wird. 
Tatsächliches  Erleben  von  Korruption  hat  einen  positiven  Effekt  auf 
Korruptionswahrnehmung. Dieser Effekt ist jedoch schwächer als jener von sozio-
ökonomischer Variablen. Eine hohe Anzahl an Zeitungen führt ebenfalls zu weniger 
Korruptionswahrnehmung. 
In  der  Literatur  (vgl. Smith  2008,  Smith/Matejku  2009)  wird  vermutet,  dass 
Korruptionswahrnehmung eher einen Indikator für soziale Unzufriedenheit darstellt 
–  im  Sinne  von  „die  da  oben  sind  alle  korrupt“  –  als  ein  Maß  für  tatsächlich 
existierende Korruption. Die gilt insbesondere für Bevölkerungsumfragen. 
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Die praktische Bedeutung dieser Ergebnisse ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Besonders 
für  Anti-Korruptionskampagnen  ist  es  von  großer  Wichtigkeit  ihre  Ergebnisse 
messen  zu  können.  Diese  Forderung  wird  von  Praktikern  immer  wieder  betont 
(Hetzer 2010: 26, Langseth 2006: 25). Ist eine Kampagne bzw. eine rechtliche oder 
politische  Maßnahme  erfolgreich,  wird  die  Korruptionswahrnehmung  aufgrund 
erhöhter  Kommunikation  über  das  Thema  und  nicht  zuletzt  durch  mediale 
Berichterstattung unweigerlich in die Höhe gehen. Das wird auch dann geschehen, 
wenn  die  tatsächliche  Korruption  (aufgrund  des  Erfolges  einer  Maßnahme) 
zurückgeht (Seligson 2006: 390).  Um Korruption valide zu messen sollten in der 
Praxis  Wahrnehmungs-  und  Erlebens-  bzw.  Viktimisierungsmaße  zumindest 
kombiniert werden. Im Zweifelsfall dürfte Korruptionserleben der validere Indikator 
sein.  Die Herausbildung von Korruptionswahrnehmung muss  jedoch noch weiter 
erforscht werden, um sie vollständig zu verstehen. Die Erkenntnisse dieser Studie 
zum  Einfluss  sozio-ökonomischer  Faktoren,  insbesondere  sozialer  Status  und 
Bildung,  und  die  Rolle  von  Korruptionserleben,  bieten  eine  Basis  für  weitere 
Untersuchungen. 
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11. Appendix
Table I Country level variables
Country
Belgium 164,68 0,59
Denmark 352,77 0,06
Germany West 267,47 0,14
Germany East 0,01
Greece 0,09
Spain 144,48 0,46
Finland 431,07 0,13
France 163,14 0,32
Ireland 182,41 0,03
Italy 137,10 0,11
Luxembourg 254,50 0,43
Netherlands 307,50 0,35
Austria 311,39 0,15
Portugal 0,01
Sweden 480,57 0,14
Great Britain 289,75 0,39
Northern Ireland
Cyprus 0,33
Czech Republic 182,55 0,11
Estonia 190,60 0,53
Hungary 217,04 0,01
Latvia 154,11 0,61
Lithuania 107,84 0,35
Malta 0,07
Poland 113,60 0,04
Slovakia 125,69 0,24
Slovenia 172,80 0,18
Bulgaria 78,98 0,23
Romania 70,33 0,21
Definition
Source
Daily Newspapers 
per 1 000 people,
Ethnolinguistic 
Fracternalization
Daily newspapers 
refer to those 
published at least 
four times a week 
and calculated as 
average circulation 
or copies printed 
per 1 000 people, 
Data from 2004,
Probability that two 
randomly selected 
people from a given 
country will not 
belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic 
group as of 1985, 
For countries of 
recent formation 
estimations by 
Roeder (2001),
UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics,
Bruk/Apenchenko 
(1964) updated by 
Roeder (2001),
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Table II Means of the index of corruption perception 
Country Mean Std. Dev.
Greece 8,1 1,3
Bulgaria 7,9 1,5
Hungary 7,8 1,8
Cyprus (Rep.) 7,7 1,7
Romania 7,6 1,9
Lithuania 7,6 1,7
Latvia 7,5 1,7
Slovenia 7,5 1,7
Portugal 7,4 1,8
Ireland 7,3 2,0
Czech Rep. 7,2 1,7
Malta 7,2 2,0
Spain 7,2 1,8
Northern Ireland 7,2 1,8
Slovakia 7,0 1,8
Italy 7,0 2,0
Germany East 6,9 1,9
EU-27 6,7 2,1
Poland 6,6 1,9
Estonia 6,6 2,0
Germany West 6,5 2,0
Belgium 6,5 2,0
France 6,4 1,9
Great Britain 6,3 2,2
Austria 5,4 2,1
Finland 5,3 2,3
Luxembourg 5,1 2,4
Netherlands 5,0 2,4
Sweden 4,9 2,5
Denmark 3,3 2,5
Index score of three questions: “There is corruption in 
local/regional/national institutions in respondent’s country”. 
Four values for answers: Totally agree (3), Tend to 
agree (2), Tend to disagree (1), Totally disagree (0).  
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009),
 for the EU-27 mean countries weighted for size (W22)
113
Table III Scatterplot age and corruption perception per country
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Table IV Means of the index of corruption perception from Eurobarometer
2005 2007 2009
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 Denmark 3,9 1 Denmark 3,3 1 Denmark 4,2
2 Finland 5,0 2 Finland 4,7 2 Sweden 6,2
3 Austria 6,2 3 The Netherlands 5,8 3 Luxembourg 6,6
4 The Netherlands 6,8 4 Sweden 6,3 4 The Netherlands 6,7
5 Sweden 6,9 5 Austria 6,7 5 Finland 7,0
6 Luxembourg 7,1 6 Luxembourg 7,1 6 Austria 7,2
7 Great Britain 7,9 7 France 7,6 7 France 8,5
8 France 8,2 8 Great Britain 7,9 8 Great Britain 8,5
9 Belgium 8,5 9 Belgium 8,1 9 Belgium 8,6
10 Germany West 8,7 10 Estonia 8,3 10 Germany West 8,7
11 Estonia 8,8 11 Malta 8,4 11 Poland 8,9
12 Spain 8,8 12 Germany West 8,5 12 Estonia 9,0
13 Northern Ireland 8,8 13 Poland 8,8 13 Italy 9,2
14 Italy 8,9 14 Ireland 8,9 14 Slovakia 9,3
15 Ireland 8,9 15 Germany East 9,0 15 Germany East 9,4
16 Malta 9,3 16 Spain 9,0 16 Northern Ireland 9,5
17 Slovenia 9,3 17 Slovakia 9,1 17 Spain 9,6
18 Latvia 9,3 18 Italy 9,2 18 Czech Republic 9,6
19 Germany East 9,4 19 Northern Ireland 9,2 19 Malta 9,9
20 Slovakia 9,5 20 Slovenia 9,2 20 Ireland 9,9
21 Cyprus (Republic) 9,5 21 Latvia 9,3 21 Latvia 9,9
22 Czech Republic 9,7 22 Cyprus (Republic) 9,4 22 Portugal 9,9
23 Lithuania 9,8 23 Czech Republic 9,6 23 Lithuania 10,0
24 Poland 9,9 24 Lithuania 9,8 24 Slovenia 10,1
25 Portugal 10,0 25 Portugal 9,8 25 Romania 10,3
26 Hungary 10,0 26 Hungary 10,2 26 Cyprus (Republic) 10,3
27 Greece 10,5 27 Bulgaria 10,4 27 Hungary 10,5
28 Romania 10,5 28 Bulgaria 10,7
EU25 8,6 29 Greece 10,5 29 Greece 10,9
EU25 8,4 EU25 8,8
EU27 8,5 EU27 8,9
Eurobarometer 64.3 (European Commission 2005), Eurobarometer 68.2 (European Commission 2007), 
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009). For EU25 and EU27 weighted for country size
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Table V Models with country variable “trust”
Model M8: Country factor: trust1 M9: Country factor: trust2
Fixed Part
Predictor coefficient std err coefficient std err
Intercept 7,61 *** 0,39 7,33 *** 0,40
-0,02 * 0,01 -0,02 * 0,01
0,24 ** 0,09 0,24 ** 0,08
0,06 0,08 0,04 0,08
0,26 *** 0,08 0,27 *** 0,07
0,25 0,15 0,22 0,13
0,32 *** 0,08 0,31 *** 0,08
gender (men) -0,05 0,04 -0,05 0,04
0,00 * 0,00 0,00 * 0,00
0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04
-3,75 0,05 0,00 0,05
correxperience 0,14 * 0,06 0,14 ** 0,06
-0,02 0,01 -0,02 * 0,01
Random Part
Variance residual (individual) 3,79 *** 0,05 3,79 *** 0,05
Variance intercept (country) 1,08 *** 0,32 1,08 *** 0,32
Variance slope (eduyrs) 0,00 * 0,00 0,00 * 0,00
Deviance (-2 Log Likelihood) 47139,6 50740,2
N respondents 26663 26663
29 29
0,22 0,22
*** p ≤ 0,001, ** p ≤ 0,01, * p ≤ 0,05, Unstructured variance, REML
 Index of corruption perception: from 0, no corruption, to 9, a lot of corruption
UNESCO 2004 (http://stats.uis.unesco.org) 
Index of corruption 
perception
Index of corruption 
perception
eduyrsa
class_employersb
class_mednonmanb
class_lownonmanb
class_employersprimaryb
class_workersb
agec
smalltownd
largetownd
truste
N countriesf
VPCg
a centered at compulsory education (9,5 years, for details see footnote on page x), 
b class_highnonman as reference, c centered at 15 years, d village and rural areas as reference,
e centered at grand mean, f Northern Ireland and East Germany included as separate entities, 
g VPC = country-level variance / ( country-level variance + individual level variance)
Eurobarometer 72.2 (European Commission 2009), Wolrd Value Survey 1990-1999, 2005-2007 (www.worldvaluessurvey.org),
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Abstract
Corruption perception is  widely used as an indicator for real  corruptionin the 
scientific literature . This paper further advances the critical debate about the validity 
of  this  indicator.  In  order  to  explore  the  formation  of  corruption  perception  on 
individual level, with paying full attention to contextual features at the same time, a 
multilevel regression analysis was performed. The dataset of the Eurobarometer 72.2 
2009 contains  more European countries  than  any other  study before.  It  includes 
26 663  citizens  from  27  European  countries,  individual  and  country  level 
determinants of corruption perception widely used in literature, as well as a question 
about the actual experience of corruption, thus making it possible to control for real 
corruption. The results show that corruption perception is particularly influenced by 
social  status  and  education.  Corruption  experience  has  a  positive  influence  on 
corruption perception, but other determinants are more influential. This study serves 
as a basis for further research on the concept of corruption perception and objective 
corruption indicators like actual corruption experience.
Key Words Corruption, Perception, Victimization, Measurement, Cross Country 
Survey, Multilevel Analysis, Social Status, Education, Criminology, Eurobarometer
Korruptionswahrnehmung  ist  in  der  wissenschaftlichen  Literatur  ein 
weitverbreiteter  Indikator  für  Korruption.  Diese  Studie  liefert  einen  Beitrag  zur 
kritischen  Auseinandersetzung  mit  der  Validität  dieses  Indikators.  Um  die 
Herausbildung von Korruptionswahrnehmung auf Individualebene zu untersuchen 
und  gleichzeitig  Kontextmerkmalen  vollste  Beachtung  zu  schenken,  wurde  eine 
Multilevel-Regressionsanalyse durchgeführt. Der Datensatz aus dem Eurobarometer 
72.2.  2009 umfasst  mehr europäische Länder  als  sämtliche bisherige Studien.  Er 
beinhaltet 26 663 befragte Personen aus 27 europäischen Ländern und eine Reihe an 
Einflussvariablen auf die Korruptionswahrnehmung, sowohl auf Individual- als auch 
auf Länderebene, die in der Literatur weitverbreitet sind. Außerdem enthält er eine 
Frage nach Korruptionsviktimisierung, mit der der Einfluss von tatsächlich erlebter 
117
Korruption  konstant  gehalten  wird.  Die  Ergebnisse  zeigen,  dass  die 
Korruptionswahrnehmung besonders von sozialem Status und Bildung beeinflusst 
wird.  Die  Studie  bietet  eine  Grundlage  für  weitere  Untersuchungen  über  die 
Herausbildung  von  Korruptionswahrnehmung,  sowie  objektive 
Korruptionsindikatoren wie tatsächlich erlebte Korruption.
Key Words Korruption, Wahrnehmung, Viktimisierung, Messung, Cross Country 
Survey,  Ländervergleich,  Multilevel  Analysis,  Sozialer  Status,  Bildung, 
Kriminologie, Eurobarometer
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